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Concepts of retirement and related moral arguments play an impor-
tant role in debates around pension reform. What retirement is – or 
should be – varies according to the surrounding welfare culture and 
an actor’s general interests and beliefs. In this paper, we study the 
meaning that specific collective actors in Germany and the UK at-
tribute to retirement, and their evaluation of post-retirement work, 
which is an exception to 'normal' retirement. For this purpose, we 
examine interviews with experts from unions, employer federations 
and relevant non-profit organisations which have been conducted in 
the context of a wider comparative project. Additionally, we draw on 
policy documents by the same actors. Our analysis of the interviews 
and the documents reveals similar retirement concepts among the 
same kinds of actors across countries: trade unions and at least 
some non-profit organisations advocate retirement as a social right 
and as a distinct (ideally work-free) phase of life. In contrast, em-
ployers have a less substantial concept of retirement. At the same 
time, when morally justifying what retirement should be in their 
view, the actors refer to ideas that establish a connection to the spe-
cific welfare culture surrounding them.
In Debatten um Rentenreformen spielen Vorstellungen darüber, 
was die Lebensphase des Ruhestands ist oder sein sollte, und
darauf bezogene moralische Argumente eine wichtige Rolle. Diese 
Vorstellungen sind zum einen von der jeweiligen Wohlfahrts-
kultur geprägt, zum anderen hängen sie eng mit den Interessen 
und Ansichten der an den Debatten beteiligten Akteure zusam-
men. In diesem Arbeitspapier untersuchen wir die Bedeutung, 
die bestimmte kollektive Akteure in Deutschland und Großbritan-
nien dem Ruhestand als Lebensphase zuschreiben, sowie ihre
Bewertung von bezahlter Arbeit jenseits der Rentengrenze, die eine 
Ausnahme vom 'normalen' Ruhestand darstellt. Zu diesem Zweck 
analysieren wir Interviews mit Experten von Gewerkschaften,
Arbeitgeberverbänden und von in diesem Feld relevanten gemein-
nützigen Organisationen. Neben den Interviews, die im Rahmen 
eines größeren vergleichenden Projekts geführt wurden, werden 
außerdem politische Dokumente (insbesondere Positionspapiere) 
der gleichen Organisationen einbezogen. Unsere Analyse der In-
terviews und Dokumente zeigt, dass vergleichbare Akteure in ver-
schiedenen Ländern auch ähnliche Ruhestandskonzepte vertreten: 
Gewerkschaften und zumindest einige der betrachteten gemein-
nützigen Organisationen sprechen sich für Ruhestand als soziales 
Recht und als eine klar abgegrenzte, idealerweise arbeitsfreie Le-
bensphase aus. Im Gegensatz dazu vertreten Arbeitgeberverbände 
ein weniger gehaltvolles Ruhestandskonzept. Gleichzeitig beziehen 
sich alle Akteure auf Ideen, die Teil der jeweiligen Wohlfahrtskultur 
sind, wenn sie moralisch rechtfertigen, was der Ruhestand in ihren 
Augen sein sollte.
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1. Introduction
Retirement as a distinct phase of life 
evolved only recently in history. The relat-
ed welfare arrangements that, at the end 
of an extended historical development, 
allowed broad sectors of the population 
to fully retire from the toil of work are a 
historically unique and defi ning feature of 
modern and contemporary welfare states. 
The introduction of these arrangements 
was based on complex processes of po-
litical interest negotiation in which many 
parties were involved. While retirement 
and pensions were not introduced for 
mainly moral reasons in the strict sense 
of altruism or charity, moral reasoning 
did play an important role in politically 
enforcing these institutions and ensuring 
their continued legitimation. 
In this paper, we aim to answer the 
question as to the role played in the le-
gitimation (or de-legitimation) of current 
pension reforms by this moral reason-
ing around retirement as a phase of life, 
and what forms this takes. In doing so, 
we assume that the interests of the ac-
tors involved are not suffi cient to explain 
these reforms. We posit that moral rea-
soning plays a particularly important role 
when established and popular welfare 
institutions like the pension system are 
reformed, with their very foundations be-
ing challenged in the process. More spe-
cifi cally, we study the meaning and the 
social relevance that important German 
and British collective actors – unions, 
employers, and old-age related non-profi t 
interest groups – attribute to the concept 
of retirement.1  For this purpose, we ana-
lyse expert interviews and a selection of 
documents which deal with reforms in the 
fi elds of pensions and work in old age. We 
pay particular attention to how the actors 
justify their views morally, or put differ-
ently: how they embed their arguments in 
the “moral economy” of retirement (Kohli 
1987), thereby balancing their vested in-
terests and the specifi c welfare culture 
they belong to. Their evaluation of post-
retirement work can be seen as part of the 
actors’ moral concepts of retirement. The 
question of how they interpret this excep-
tion from retirement can help us to further 
unpack their often implicit views on what 
retirement should be.
Analysing this ideational dimension 
of retirement connects research on age-
ing and retirement on the one hand and 
welfare cultures or ideas in social policy 
on the other – two strands of research that 
have not often been explicitly connected 
to date. Based on this approach, we ex-
pect to gain valuable insights into two is-
sues. First, the moral ideas incorporated 
in welfare institutions and negotiated 
in the political process are inextricably 
linked to individual life courses and their 
experience (see Kohli 1986a, b; Leisering 
2004): The welfare state co-constitutes in-
dividual life courses in modern societies. 
Individual actors (try to) act according to 
the norms and values implied in welfare 
(and other) institutions (for the transition 
to retirement see Jansen 2013). They eval-
uate their own lives and those of others 
according to these ideas, for example the 
idea of what constitutes a good life and, 
more specifi cally, a ‘good’ retirement (see 
also Sargent et al. 2013). The idea of what 
constitutes a ‘good’ retirement varies ac-
cording to the concrete welfare culture 
and institutions. This has not often been 
studied systematically and empirically. 
Second, these ideational dimensions of 
old age welfare policies are at least one 
important driver of the related political 
processes (for examples see van Oorschot 
et al. 2008; van Oorschot 2007). They help 
to legitimise existing regulations and re-
lated reforms – particular in a situation 
when a popular institution is fundamen-
tally changed – and they can serve to con-
vince potential voters or potential politi-
cal allies; nonetheless, their exact impact 
depends on the contingencies of concrete 
historical situations.
More specifi cally, we examine in an 
exploratory way how the ideational aspect 
of welfare arrangements affecting retire-
ment and old age is manifest in selected 
collective actors’ positions in two differ-
ent welfare regimes. We have to limit our 
analysis to the question of how retirement 
is conceptualised and how pensions are 
bound up in this. We only partly touch 
upon the complex inequality-related and 
distributional questions that play a central 
role in debates about pension reforms. 
Furthermore, unless they are necessary 
to understand the actors’ positions, we do 
not provide a detailed analysis of the relat-
ed political processes themselves (see for 
example Kohli/Arza 2011 for a more gen-
eral overview of pensions in Europe and 
the political economy of related reforms).
The paper is divided into a shorter, 
theoretical part and the presentation of 
the results of our empirical analysis. In 
more detail, we proceed as follows: In 
the next section (2.), we elaborate on the 
moral dimension of retirement in the con-
text of different welfare cultures. In the 
subsequent step (3.), we include the role 
of collective actors in welfare cultures and 
welfare reforms in our theoretical per-
spective. To prepare our empirical inves-
tigation, we briefl y present the relevant 
institutional background for our country 
cases (4.) and then (5.) our methods, sam-
ple selection, and aim of analysis. In the 
second, empirical part of our paper, we 
analyse the concepts of retirement of the 
actors we selected for this purpose: union 
confederations (6.), employer organisa-
tions (7.), and non-profi t interest organi-
sations in the fi elds of old age and pen-
sion (8.). We end with a short conclusion 
regarding our results and future research 
on the subject (9.).
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2. The Moral Economy of Retirement in the 
Context of Different Welfare Cultures
Retirement and pension systems are cru-
cial elements of almost every contempo-
rary welfare system. It is on the basis of 
these welfare arrangements that old age 
as a separate and not only residual life 
stage became part of the lives of a major-
ity of people – retirement is part of the 
modern institutionalised life course as we 
know it today (Kohli 1986a). Increased 
life expectancy and the concentration of 
death in higher ages for large parts of the 
population were preconditional to this. 
With regard to the organisation of work 
in industrial societies, but also applicable 
in contemporary capitalist market econo-
mies, Kohli (1987, see also Kohli 1986a, 
b) has described a number of “functions“ 
of modern institutionalised life course 
regimes, in the sense of (contingent) an-
swers to “some of the structural prob-
lems that arise with the transition from a 
household economy to an economy based 
on free labor“ (Kohli 1987: 129). Retire-
ment is a model example of these “func-
tions“: Retiring people at a certain fi xed 
age provides a rational and economical 
mechanism to organise succession on the 
labour market and in companies; it helps 
maintain or increase the productivity of 
the workforce; and it is at the same time a 
solution to the problems of the integration 
of different life domains and of social con-
trol in contemporary, more individualised 
societies in which direct mechanisms of 
social control have lost signifi cance. In a 
wider perspective, retirement and the wel-
fare state can even play an important part 
in nation-building (Kohli/Arza 2011: 252).
In what ways retirement and pensions 
are related to questions of integration and 
social control can be understood more 
clearly if we consider contemporary mar-
ket economies as “work societies” (Kohli 
1987: 128). The concept of work society 
that has been widely used in German soci-
ology points to the central role that formal 
paid work2 plays in these societies. It is 
not only a means of producing goods and 
services, but also a central mechanism of 
social integration and thus a central norm 
according to which people align their 
lives – paid work and working are part 
of the culture of contemporary societies. 
This still seems to be valid today, although 
the organisation, structure and contents 
of work have been changing rapidly and 
signifi cantly.3 
Against this background of contempo-
rary societies still being centred around 
formal work, the fundamental problem 
connected to the ‘rational mechanism’ of 
retirement becomes evident: In a society 
where work is a central part of life, where 
people defi ne who they are (mainly) 
through their work, how can a prolonged 
(and growing) period without work be 
justifi ed? Kohli’s (1987) answer to this 
question refers to the notion of “moral 
economy” (Thompson 1971). In Kohli’s 
view, retirement and pension systems are 
not purely rational or “utilitarian” (Kohli 
1987: 128) forms of organising the ex-
change of work and income in a long-term 
relationship between the individual and 
the state. Rather, pension systems 
“contain a clear element of reciproc-
ity based on morally bounded claims 
and expectations, or – as it is usually 
termed in the German welfare discus-
sion – of solidarity between the gen-
erations [...]. They mix instrumental 
elements in the sense of calculable 
returns for investments with recipro-
cal elements in the sense of a nor-
mative system of mutual obligations. 
The decisive point, however, is that 
the former elements are ‘embedded’ 
in the latter; therefore, it is feasible 
to interpret retirement in terms of the 
moral economy” (Kohli 1987: 128).
Recent economic sociology research 
has demonstrated convincingly that capi-
talist markets constitute normative orders 
in themselves (see for example Fourcade/
Healey 2007; Beckert 2009), so that even 
the strictly “instrumental elements” (Koh-
li 1987: 128) are in fact part of a specifi c 
normative order and thus morally loaded.4  
So the institution of retirement, like other 
welfare regulations, always has a sym-
bolic aspect, in addition to its aspect of 
concrete benefi ts or payments (Kaufmann 
2009, 1997: 301). As this symbolic aspect 
is closely connected to the integrative 
function of welfare institutions and to the 
recognition of individuals and their rights, 
it is crucial for an adequate understanding 
of welfare regimes as normative orders.
The exact form, content and mix of 
different “instrumental” and “reciprocal” 
elements (Kohli 1987: 128), for example, 
vary in different welfare regimes. Welfare 
regimes and their specifi c welfare regula-
tions are to some extent the expression of 
welfare cultures, which comprise “stocks 
of knowledge, values and ideals” (Pfau-
Effi nger 2005: 4; see also van Oorschot 
2007) and thus also the moral economy 
of the welfare state.5 Historically, the va-
rieties of welfare regimes can be traced 
back to differences in the political evolu-
tion of the (welfare) state, with different 
political actors shaping these processes 
to differing degrees, and also to wider 
cultural mores such as religious traditions 
and the balance between individualism 
and collectivism (see for example Esping-
Andersen 1990; for more examples see 
van Oorschot et al. 2008; Manow 2004).
Welfare cultures consist of ideas, and 
ideas are the basic ‘entities’ of meaning 
which can form more complex systems of 
description or belief; they shape (together 
with other factors) individual or collective 
action in that they reduce the range of 
meaningful or appropriate possibilities of 
action, for example in the area of welfare 
regulations. We understand ideas as ele-
ments of cognitive content, i.e. concepts, 
statements, assumptions, speculations 
etc. which are related to how an assumed 
reality is, was or will be, how it could or 
should be. In the literature on ideas and 
welfare states, a plethora of terms is used 
for (general or specifi c) ideas and more 
complex systems of ideas, such as mor-
al economy, knowledge, world views, or 
paradigms (see Münnich 2011a and b for 
a further discussion and examples). De-
scriptive ideas, i.e. statements about how 
the world is, can be differentiated from 
normative ideas which refer to an ideal or 
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desirable world (see for example Nullmei-
er/Rüb 1993: 45-51), although this differ-
entiation is perhaps not a categorical one 
as descriptions of reality are often closely 
linked to normative ideas. The collective 
actors whose positions are studied below 
use the ideas that constitute a welfare 
culture to describe the social reality in a 
specifi c and necessarily selective way – to 
justify their normative position and to de-
rive political claims from them.
Concrete (welfare) institutions always 
involve an ideational aspect and thus 
form part of a welfare culture. Welfare 
institutions basically consist of regula-
tions which govern the actual practice 
of the distribution of symbolic and ma-
terial resources – practices which at the 
same time imply moral ideas about what 
is good and just, who deserves what etc. 
Institutions cannot be reduced to this 
ideational aspect, as they are much more 
than that (namely concrete practices etc.) 
and emerge and evolve to some extent 
independently from ideas. Despite their 
ideational dimension, it is, therefore, use-
ful for analytical purposes to differentiate 
between institutions (i.e. the concrete 
regulations and practices mentioned) on 
the one hand, and on the other hand the 
stocks of ideas of a welfare culture. These 
stocks of ideas comprise, in turn, much 
more than those that are materialised in 
institutions alone; they also comprise, 
for example, other ideas that are aired in 
welfare-related reform discourses. Some 
of these ideas will be more, some less 
central to the specifi c welfare culture in 
question. This does not imply that these 
ideas form a consistent and interrelated 
system that is free from contradiction and 
can be easily determined (Pfau-Effi nger 
2005: 6). The relationship of these ideas 
to the dominating welfare culture will be 
more of a relative nature.6  In comparison 
to the concrete institutions, the moral ide-
as that are central to a welfare culture can 
change (more) quickly and are more fl ex-
ible to (re-)interpretation by different ac-
tors.7  Institutions are, to put it differently, 
fi xed versions of certain parts of these 
stocks of ideas, more specifi cally those 
parts that prevailed and have been legally 
institutionalised at some historical point 
in the past. Consequently, asynchronici-
ties between institutions and other parts 
of a welfare culture may occur and these 
are likely to lead eventually to institutional 
change.
The following short remarks aim at 
systematising the variety of retirement-
related concrete institutions on the one 
hand and stocks of particularly norma-
tive (but also descriptive) ideas on the 
other; they are necessarily selective and 
can only touch upon questions of welfare 
distribution and inequalities. From a very 
general perspective, concrete welfare reg-
ulations vary with the nature of the role 
assumed by the state with regard to im-
portant life course risks and to the extent 
to which certain life phases are decom-
modifi ed. Where the state plays a strong 
role in protecting against individual (life 
course) risks, individuals have to rely less 
on (labour) markets to secure their living 
(see for example Esping-Andersen 1990). 
Applied to old age, retirement, and pen-
sions, this implies that public elements of 
the pension system (‘fi rst pillar’) can be 
more or less important in different welfare 
regimes. Here, relying on markets refers 
not only to the necessity to sell one’s la-
bour on the labour market, but also to 
having to rely on private (pension) insur-
ance, or more generally fi nancial markets 
to secure one’s living in old age. This can 
be exemplifi ed by the OECD’s differentia-
tion between public pension systems that 
focus on maintaining a living standard at 
least for those with continuous employ-
ment biographies (which implies a higher 
degree of decommodifi cation), on the 
one hand, and systems that aim predomi-
nantly at poverty prevention, on the other 
(OECD 2009: 55).
In line with the concrete regulations, 
the specifi c concept of retirement also var-
ies, i.e. the ideas and perceptions of what 
retirement and pensioners are or rather 
what they should be. Here, our considera-
tions partly build on the literature, partly 
they have the nature of heuristic assump-
tions. Several aspects of welfare cultures 
come together in the concept of retire-
ment, ideas about “how social security and 
employment should be connected”, about 
social inclusion and exclusion, about the 
relationship between state and market as 
well as ideas about the welfare mix and 
the family (Pfau-Effi nger 2005: 8). The 
higher the degree of decommodifi cation 
of old age is, in other words the more the 
pension system is directed at8 maintain-
ing a certain living standard, the more re-
tirement becomes a distinct phase of life 
in its own right. This very often coincides 
with a strong public pension system. As 
such a form of retirement is more decou-
pled from the core of a work society and 
the laws of the labour market, the need to 
justify retirement as a period which is free 
of work is more pressing, i.e. the need for 
a normative underpinning of retirement. 
This does not imply that the regulations 
regarding retirement determine the ideas 
that surround it – rather, they both came 
into existence through a complex interplay 
with each other (and with other infl uences, 
see above), they cannot be deduced from 
each other, and they constantly continue to 
evolve in this form.
Which form can this moral underpin-
ning of retirement as a phase free from 
formal paid work take? We assume that 
there are a number of different and vari-
able arguments which can serve to mor-
ally justify the existence of retirement as 
a distinct phase of life.9 They all adopt the 
notion of work-free retirement, although 
not necessarily to the same degree. A fi rst 
argument that justifi es work-free retire-
ment directly relates to the function of 
generational succession. The relevance 
of succession can be very generally as-
sociated with retirement as a ‘functional’ 
life course institution; yet it can also be 
applied more specifi cally and especially 
in times of high unemployment by argu-
ing that retiring from the labour market is 
good for society because in this way, jobs 
are freed-up that can be fi lled by younger 
workers. This line of reasoning was used, 
for example, in order to justify generous 
arrangements for early retirement (Kohli/
Rein 1991: 13; for Germany: Jacobs et 
al. 1991; for the UK: Laczko/Phillipson 
1991). At least on a macro level, it has 
been refuted by economists as the ‘lump 
of labour fallacy’.
Second, the justifi cation can of course 
be related to the work society itself in pos-
iting retirement as “a just reward for a life’s 
toil” (Leisering 2004: 209). This makes 
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more sense in systems where public pen-
sion payments are based on collectively 
organised contributions and higher con-
tributions are connected to higher pen-
sion payments – as is typically the case 
in Bismarckian systems. In Beveridgian 
systems, by contrast, the state only fur-
nishes a very basic provision in old age 
and means-tested benefi ts are (relatively) 
more important. Here, the reference to 
a vulnerable subgroup of (current or fu-
ture) pensioners should be stronger, as-
suming at the same time that the larger 
non-vulnerable subgroup (which in-
cludes most current employees) is able 
to provide for itself by means of predomi-
nantly individually organised forms of 
old age provision. In this case, poor or 
frail pensioners are like other poor and 
vulnerable groups for whom the state 
provides the basic security net based 
only on their needs. Occupational pen-
sions complicate the picture as they are 
organised very differently and regulated 
to differing degrees in different coun-
tries. In some countries they are manda-
tory and/or form a substantial part of old 
age incomes. Generally, their underlying 
moral logic is also related to what has 
been achieved during a person’s working 
life, and in some systems this also applies 
to the question of who benefi ts from an 
occupational pension and who does not. 
However, occupational pensions are usu-
ally organised according to some kind of 
funding principle and thus are closer to 
the principles of a more ‘rational’ indi-
vidual investment, in (smaller or larger) 
contrast to public pensions.
The normative and regulative link be-
tween ‘well-deserved’ retirement and a 
hard and long working life can be more 
or less strong. In an extreme case and 
as a third kind of argument, the right to 
a work-free retirement can be claimed 
more or less regardless of any links to 
paid work: In this case, everyone has a 
right to retirement in which they can do 
whatever suits them. The difference be-
tween this justifi cation and a retirement 
which is well-deserved because of a work-
ing career is of course more relative than 
categorical: There might be wider or nar-
rower defi nitions of who has deserved re-
tirement through which kind of work, and 
unpaid social contributions like caring for 
children10 can be included to differing de-
grees in the defi nition of what constitutes 
work and deserved claims to retirement.
This kind of concept of retirement 
based on a right to a work-free phase of 
life comes closest to the idea of retire-
ment “as a matter of social and political 
rights” (Leisering 2004: 221). Leiser-
ing contrasts this idea, which he sees 
as typical for Bismarckian regimes, to a 
view on retirement “as a matter of civil 
rights”. The latter implies that there is 
no, or a less positively defi ned concept 
of retirement which contains substantial 
assumptions on what people should or 
can do in this period of life. Therefore, 
retirement is seen rather in the context 
of the right to work and not to be ex-
cluded from the work society, as it is, for 
instance, defended in old age discrimi-
nation debates. According to Leisering, 
this view is more important in the US 
than in continental Europe. The UK, as 
a relatively liberal welfare state, can be 
regarded as being between these two ex-
tremes (see below).
These lines of moral reasoning about 
why retirement is well deserved or justi-
fi ed are certainly only the most important 
examples. Although they do imply differ-
ent foci, they could in principle comple-
ment each other or be complemented 
by additional arguments; and they can 
be differentiated and applied in fl exible 
ways and combinations. In any case, ac-
cording to the above, all of these moral 
underpinnings should be more important 
and widespread in pension systems with 
a higher degree of public organisation, 
which provide a higher degree of decom-
modifi cation in old age and aim at secur-
ing pensioners’ previous living standard 
and not only at preventing poverty. Of 
course, this implies a continuum of pen-
sion systems with more or less strong 
public pillars and degrees of decommodi-
fi cation (rather than a dichotomy), and 
correspondingly the structural need to 
justify retirement differs in relative and 
not in absolute terms.
The absence of a substantial, elabo-
rate and comprehensive concept of retire-
ment in a welfare culture does of course 
not imply that individual life courses are 
necessarily shaped less by welfare regula-
tions and related ideas. Rather, such life 
course policies – which Leisering (2004: 
210, original italics left out) calls “nega-
tive life course policies” – infl uence in-
dividual lives and individual perceptions 
indirectly, for example by leaving the re-
sponsibility for old age to the individual, 
families and markets. In the following, 
we touch upon these moral ideas which 
are directly or explicitly related to the life 
course when they arise, but they are not 
in the focus of our analysis. Furthermore, 
even ‘positive’ life course policies such as 
substantial normative concepts of retire-
ment, may have less explicit or “tacit” 
dimensions (Leisering 2004: 210), i.e. 
normative assumptions and rules which 
are not directly obvious, or might even 
contradict the offi cial ones.
3. The Role of Collective Actors in Welfare 
Cultures and Welfare Reforms
Welfare cultures, i.e. the “stocks of knowl-
edge, values and ideals” about welfare 
provision (Pfau-Effi nger 2005: 4) are, like 
welfare regulations (in a strict sense), not 
necessarily consistent and homogene-
ous, and they continuously change. While 
there is a dominating or hegemonic wel-
fare culture to be found in every welfare 
system, i.e. a culture that is closely inter-
linked with the existing regulations and 
built on longstanding historical traditions, 
the welfare culture at large encompasses 
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a broader stock of ideas and values. The 
existing welfare regulations are the tem-
porary and preliminary result of com-
promises between many different actors 
who each have their own vested interests, 
values and beliefs. In the struggles about 
which beliefs should be ‘fi xed’ in the form 
of concrete regulations (i.e. institutions), 
some actors strive for reconfi gurations of 
welfare institutions and the dominating 
moral economy. Thus only the positions 
of some actors closely correspond to the 
ideas at the centre of the dominating (and 
institutionalised) welfare culture, whereas 
other, more marginal positions potentially 
aim to change the dominating welfare 
culture. Furthermore, welfare cultures (in 
contemporary Western societies) are not 
only open to change from within, but also 
to infl uences from outside, be it other pol-
icy areas or inter- or supranational politics 
and policies (such as those from the EU).
Accordingly, reform debates encom-
pass a multiplicity of voices and argu-
ments. Collective actors, when morally 
justifying their (reform) goals, have to 
connect different tasks when putting 
forward and deploying their arguments: 
First, they have to represent the interests 
of their members which form the core of 
their identity as a collective actor.11 These 
interests and their formulation are at the 
same time closely linked to specifi c types 
of moral arguments. Second, even actors 
in favour of radical reforms have to em-
bed their arguments in the dominating 
moral economy of retirement, at least to a 
certain degree. If propositions are mean-
ingfully linked to the existing system and 
legitimated with reference to already es-
tablished ideas and values, they are more 
likely to be understood and accepted. Both 
the second and the fi rst task point to the 
ideational dimension of interests and their 
formulation, which makes it implausible 
to conceptualise ideas and interests as 
absolute contrasts and mutually exclusive 
(see also Münnich 2011a). Third, specifi c 
arguments in concrete contexts also have 
to follow situational dynamics which arise 
from the interaction with other actors on 
specifi c occasions. For example, most of 
the position papers which are used below 
were published when new welfare laws 
came into effect or reform propositions 
were brought forward by other actors.
In brief, when arguing their case, col-
lective actors have to balance their vested 
interests, the welfare culture they live in 
and situational aspects.12 In this sense, 
the ideas constituting a welfare culture 
are similar to a stock of building blocks 
of different shapes and sizes. This vari-
ety of building blocks can be used fl ex-
ibly to construct buildings, as ideas can 
be applied fl exibly to justify, but also do 
de-legitimise welfare arrangements and 
reforms. However, the stock of building 
blocks that are available in a specifi c wel-
fare culture is neither indefi nite nor ar-
bitrary with regard to the buildings that 
can be constructed – i.e. with regard to 
the policies that can be justifi ed through 
certain ideas: “The cultural values and 
ideals which predominate in the welfare 
culture restrict the spectrum of possible 
policies of a welfare state” (Pfau-Effi nger 
2005: 4). Thus the policies pursued (or 
the buildings constructed) differ between 
countries, while some of their compo-
nents might be similar or even identical. 
Furthermore, these sets of ideas are not 
necessarily free from contradictions and 
will be ordered around the centre of ideas 
that constitutes the dominating welfare 
culture – which might also (slowly) shift. 
Different actors in one and the same wel-
fare culture will in general prefer or em-
phasise different ideas from this stock of 
ideas, or they will refer to the same or very 
similar ideas, but interpret or accentuate 
them differently. Further below, we will 
illustrate this with regard to the justifi ca-
tion of retirement in Germany and the UK.
4. Country Cases: Germany and the UK 
(Institutional Background and Reforms)
Although change in the area of pension 
policies is not exactly rapid, many coun-
tries have undertaken signifi cant reforms 
in the fi elds of pension policies in the re-
cent two decades, usually as a reaction to 
long-term demographic shifts and eco-
nomic stagnation or crisis. As far as the 
policy area in question is concerned, the 
structure and the roots of the pension sys-
tem, our two cases can be seen as most 
– or at least very – dissimilar cases; they 
should thus provide a strong contrast 
when it comes to their moral justifi ca-
tion. Germany has traditionally been an 
exemplary case of a Bismarckian welfare 
regime with a higher degree of old-age 
decommodifi cation and a focus by the 
strong state pension on maintaining the 
living standard of pensioners (see for ex-
ample Schulze/Jochem 2007; also Kohli 
1987; Meyer/Bridgen 2011). The public 
social insurance covers most employees 
(with contributions being shared equally 
between employers and employees), but 
not the self-employed and civil servants, 
to name only the two most important ex-
ceptions in the relatively fragmented sys-
tem. This fi rst pillar of the pension system 
provides the bulk of current pensioners’ 
incomes. It is characterised by a strong 
relationship to earnings before retirement 
and is thus ‘equivalence-related’ – with the 
explicit aim that differences in pension in-
come should refl ect differences in lifetime 
income. The second pillar of occupational 
pensions only plays a minor role for some 
current pensioners (in particular the male 
core employees of traditional industries 
or employees in the public sector), whilst 
the third pillar is negligible except for the 
self-employed.
However, the pension reforms since 
the beginning of the 1990s have weak-
ened the role of the traditionally strong 
fi rst pillar in the German system (see 
Meyer/Bridgen 2011; Ginn et al. 2009; 
Schulze/Jochem 2007; Schmähl 2007). As 
a fi rst step, most early retirement routes 
were closed or are still only possible with 
considerable reductions in pension pay-
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ments. These early retirement regula-
tions had been introduced to alleviate 
labour market problems and were wide-
spread in the 1980s and 1990s (see for 
example Jacobs et al. 1991). Furthermore, 
the gradual rise of the state retirement 
age to 67 has started (after the increase 
in women’s retirement age was recently 
concluded) and the level of future pen-
sion payments has been lowered. This 
was complemented by the introduction 
of subsidized private pensions which are 
supposed to compensate for the losses in 
public pensions for future pensioners. All 
these changes – and these are only the 
most important ones – have led to fi erce 
debates among the relevant political ac-
tors.13 Together with labour market relat-
ed reforms and their consequences (see 
Hinrichs 2012), the pension reforms have 
partly moved the German welfare system 
into a more ‘liberal’ direction in terms of 
welfare regimes, although not every sin-
gle reform fi ts that description. Most of 
the reforms will only be fully implemented 
in the future, which is why the related de-
bates are ongoing, as can be seen below. 
The UK pension system (for its history 
see Harris 2006; Pemberton 2006), by 
contrast, is characterised by a greater em-
phasis on private pension provision and a 
weak fi rst pillar (see Meyer/Bridgen 2011; 
Schulze/Moran 2007; Bridgen/Meyer 
2007): the basic State Pension provides a 
fl atrate benefi t based purely on the num-
ber of years of contribution, and covers all 
employed and self-employed. The State 
Second Pension (S2P) is an earnings-
related second layer in the fi rst pension 
pillar; however, until recently opting out 
of this pension scheme and replacing it 
by an occupational pension was possible. 
As decided in the Pensions Act 2014, S2P 
will be phased out from 2016 onwards, 
while the rate of the State Pension will si-
multaneously increase considerably. 
In particular occupational pensions, 
the second pillar, but also private pension 
schemes in the third pillar are much more 
important in the UK than in Germany, al-
though they still do not cover the majority 
of the population. This is also the reason 
why many more pensioners have to claim 
means-tested old age benefi ts, pensioner 
poverty is much more widespread, and 
old age incomes are much more unequal-
ly distributed in the UK than in Germany 
(Zaidi 2010). Very recently, however, UK 
pensioner poverty rates seem to have 
dropped and are now below the German 
level (OECD 2013: 165, using the 50 per 
cent of the median income as poverty 
threshold). Although these problems in 
the UK are not new, they have been ag-
gravated by other changes: for some time 
now, generous defi ned benefi t pensions 
in the second pillar have been replaced 
by less generous defi ned contribution 
pension plans, whose outcomes are less 
secure and diffi cult to project. Over and 
above that, mismanagement of private 
pensions and the recent fi nancial crisis 
have made private and occupational pen-
sion plans much less reliable and secure.
Recent reforms (for overviews see 
Ginn et al. 2009; Schulze/Moran 2007; 
Taylor-Gooby 2005) have introduced ob-
ligatory pension provision in the second 
pillar. In the cases where employers can-
not provide an occupational pension, a 
scheme organised by the state (National 
Employment Savings Trust) will gradually 
become obligatory for different groups of 
workers. Further regulation aims at pro-
tecting people better from pension mis-
management through the Pension Protec-
tion Fund. Opting out of the State Second 
Pension has become more diffi cult and 
will become impossible in the future.14 
With regard to the state pension, the ‘tri-
ple lock’ introduced in 2011 is supposed 
to stabilise the level of the basic State 
Pension by raising it each year in line with 
prices, earnings, or 2.5 per cent, which-
ever is the highest. Finally, as in Germany, 
the state pension age was also the object 
of recent reforms: the state pension age 
has increased to 65 for women, some-
thing which will be concluded in 2018, 
and will then be raised to an age of 68 for 
the whole population.15 These reforms are 
not less debated than in Germany, and in 
the face of persistently high rates of pen-
sioner poverty many actors are in favour 
of a more generous state pension system.
Finally, a related and also much debat-
ed reform was the abolition of the default 
retirement age (DRA) in 2011 which had 
become necessary because the law did 
not conform to European equality regu-
lations. The default retirement age had 
been only introduced in 2006 and allowed 
employers to dismiss older workers on the 
sole grounds that they had reached state 
retirement age, with the latter having the 
right to request working longer. In Ger-
many, no such general (federal) law ever 
existed. However, retirement ages are of-
ten fi xed on the level of specifi c occupa-
tions, in collective labour agreements and 
on company level, and constitute a strong 
norm (see for example Mahlmann 2011: 
82-86; O’Dempsey et al. 2011: 68, 75).
5. Methods, Sample Selection and Aim of Analysis
The empirical basis of our analysis are 
transcripts of semi-structured expert in-
terviews and selected documents of the 
interviewed actors. The latter are mostly 
position papers (in various forms, includ-
ing consultation responses and briefi ngs), 
but also press releases and, on one occa-
sion, a report on a member survey. The 
expert interviews were conducted be-
tween 2011 and 2012 in Germany and 
the UK, as part of a wider research pro-
ject on paid work beyond retirement age 
comparing these two most or very dis-
similar country cases. We defi ne experts 
as individuals who work for and represent 
socio-political actors (here: trade unions, 
employer confederations, non-profi t inter-
est organisations) and have considerable 
expertise in pension and/or labour market 
policies. This expertise not only compris-
es specifi c substantive knowledge of poli-
cy and reform contents, but also interpre-
tative knowledge on how to deploy ideas 
and values in such a way that the three 
tasks mentioned above are balanced. This 
relates, for example, to the ways in which 
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different values and ideas are prioritised 
(or put forward at all), how they are ‘trans-
lated’ into concrete examples (of what is 
good and thus a valid policy target, and 
what is not), how change is described and 
how opposing positions are specifi ed and 
delegitimised. Although the experts are 
trained to use this interpretative knowl-
edge strategically and to balance the 
tasks mentioned above (to communicate 
and legitimize their interests, embed their 
arguments in the welfare culture and ac-
count for situational aspects), this does 
not necessarily happen in a completely 
conscious and planned way, especially 
not in the interviews.
The expert interviews were semi-
structured. This characteristic provided 
the interviewer with enough fl exibility 
to adapt the predefi ned questions in the 
interview guide to the specifi c interview 
situation. For instance, the interviewer 
was free to adjust questions, ask sponta-
neous ones or to adapt the interview to 
time constraints. For parts of the inter-
views, we adopted a discursive interview 
technique (Ullrich 1999). This means 
that, while the expert was given space to 
elaborate on the organisation’s position, 
the interviewer carefully presented coun-
ter opinions to him. The aim of this ap-
proach was to bring the interview closer 
to a natural discussion about the issues. 
In this way, the experts were encouraged 
to refl ect on other actors’ evaluations of 
specifi c policies, reforms and their con-
sequences, and thus to more explicitly 
legitimise the policy preferences of the 
actor they represent.
The main themes of the interviews 
were the organisation’s evaluation of re-
cent pension reforms and labour market 
policies for older workers as well as the 
general value orientations of the collec-
tive actor. This also included a question 
on people working beyond retirement 
age and the evaluation of post-retirement 
work by the actor. The interviews started 
out with a broad question on the social 
signifi cance of retirement.16 This rather 
unusual question was aimed at inducing 
the expert to elaborate on what retirement 
means to the organisation he represents.
The complementary inclusion of doc-
uments in our analysis serves to put our 
material on a fi rm basis: we make sure 
that the experts’ positions are not overly 
contingent on the dynamics of the con-
crete interview and accurately represent 
the organisations’ views. In this respect 
and with only one minor exception, the 
interviews proved to be ‘robust’, because 
the arguments presented were very simi-
lar to those written down in the docu-
ments. In some cases this even included 
the exact choice of words, which is not 
surprising because some of the experts 
had written the documents themselves. 
Conversely, the interviews allowed us to 
cover themes that were not well covered 
in the documents, including those that are 
not necessarily in the focus of the specifi c 
actor – thus creating a broader basis for 
comparison. At the same time, in com-
parison to the documents, the interviews 
turned out to contain more explicit evalu-
ations and references to moral values. 
Since we probed for these more abstract 
moral references, the experts were forced 
to elaborate on ideas that are self-evident 
to them and to justify their positions more 
clearly. 
For this paper, we selected a specifi c 
group of actors from our overall sample 
of 24 sociopolitical actors: The German 
Bundesvereinigung Deutscher Arbeit-
geberverbände (BDA – Confederation of 
German Employers’ Associations) and 
the UK’s Confederation of British Indus-
try (CBI) represent the employers’ side. 
Correspondingly, the German Deutscher 
Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB – Confedera-
tion of German Trade Unions) and its 
British equivalent Trades Union Con-
gress (TUC) speak for the unions. We also 
selected the Sozialverband Deutschland 
(SoVD – approximately ‘social associa-
tion Germany’) and the Bundesarbeitsge-
meinschaft der Seniorenorganisationen 
(BAGSO – approximately ‘federal con-
sortium of seniors’ organisations’) for 
the German non-profi t side. For the UK, 
exemplary non-profi t actors are the Na-
tional Pensioners Convention (NPC) and 
the charity Age UK. Whilst the ‘classical’ 
cases of the employer confederations and 
trade unions represent strongly compet-
ing interests in the reform fi elds of pen-
sions and labour markets (Ebbinghaus 
2006), the organisations chosen in the 
non-profi t sector represent the interests 
of pensioners, older people or (as in the 
case of the German SoVD) more broadly 
those of pensioners, disabled people, pa-
tients or those in need of care. For vari-
ous reasons, including the consideration 
that they have less power, we expect 
these organisations from the third sector 
to relate very explicitly to moral values 
and justifi cations with regard to pen-
sions, retirement and old age in general 
and be less confi ned by strategic-political 
constraints.
All of these actors have in common 
the fact that they are interest groups 
and none of them is directly included in 
the political or even legislative process, 
as would be the case with parties. None-
theless, they are frequently involved in 
consultation processes which are part of 
the broader political processes of decision 
making. Despite this general similarity, 
their importance and position in the two 
countries are not the same, because the 
political systems differ considerably, for 
example in the number of veto points or 
corporative traditions (see also Schulze/
Moran 2007; Schulze/Jochem 2007). The 
unions’ veto power is traditionally strong-
er in regimes like Germany, and still to-
day the power of the German unions and 
the unions’ confederation is, despite their 
relative decline, much wider than that of 
their more fragmented and less central-
ized counterparts in the UK (see Flynn 
et al. 2013; Ebbinghaus 2006: 773-774), 
with collective labour agreements playing 
a major role at least for large German in-
dustries, and consensus orientation being 
generally more relevant in Germany. Fur-
thermore, the non-profi t interest organi-
sations traditionally also have a stronger 
position in the German corporatist state 
(Zimmer et al. 2009; for the UK compare 
Kendall 2009), although this is not nec-
essarily the case for the actors chosen 
here (especially not for the BAGSO). In 
Germany, however, there are no strong 
organisations comparable to the British 
NPC or Age UK, exclusively representing 
older people or pensioners. The German 
corporatist landscape of actors still cuts 
across generational or age-related divides, 
although within organisations, subgroups 
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of older people sometimes organise them-
selves (for example in parties) and are 
growing stronger.17  
The documents were selected on the 
basis of their thematic relevance to our 
research question (for a list of the docu-
ments see attachment 1). The most im-
portant themes they cover are pension 
reforms which are planned or have come 
into effect, labour market inclusion and 
(less often) social participation of older 
people and retirees, age discrimination in 
general and the (abolition of) the default 
retirement age (in the UK). As a few ac-
tors only publish documents infrequently 
and only on specifi c occasions, the docu-
ments cover the time span 2005 to 2013. 
The large majority of the documents is 
from 2010 and 2011, thus close to the 
time when the interviews were conduct-
ed. Nonetheless, even some aspects of 
these relatively recent documents and the 
interviews have already been overtaken 
by new decisions especially in the fi eld of 
pensions which will be mentioned where 
necessary, or have already been men-
tioned above. In our view, however, this 
does not undermine our basic results, be-
cause the moral reasoning around these 
policies does not depend on single policy 
measures and should only change slowly.
Starting from the preliminary consid-
erations outlined so far, the interviews and 
the documents were examined systemati-
cally and in a team in order to map the 
actors’ positions with regard to the central 
questions we ask. The exploratory analy-
sis of the interviews and the documents 
is necessarily selective, as it focuses on a 
very specifi c aspect of the interviews and 
the documents, namely the interpreta-
tive knowledge of the actors with regard 
to the moral justifi cation of retirement – 
knowledge that becomes manifest inter 
alia when policies related to pensions and 
work in old age are discussed and evalu-
ated. This selectiveness of our analysis 
not only applies to the substance of the 
positions, but also to the more ‘techni-
cal’ details of the actors’ arguments (for 
example the specifi cs of regulations and 
their application), which are often elabo-
rated on meticulously, especially in the 
documents.
The beginning of the interviews, with 
the question about the social signifi cance 
of retirement, was pre-defi ned as con-
taining hints at the moral underpinnings 
of retirement. Later in the interview, the 
expert’s evaluation of work post retire-
ment – which can be seen as an excep-
tion to the norm of retirement – helps us 
to understand what retirement means to 
the specifi c actor and how they ‘defend’ 
retirement against this anomaly. Other 
aspects touching on our main questions 
were widely scattered across the inter-
views and the documents; the increase 
in retirement age, older people’s ability 
to work and other aspects of pension re-
forms such as the costs and the level of 
pensions and the abolition of the default 
retirement age (DRA, in the UK) emerged 
as the most important (additional) themes 
in the context of our main question.
How the experts answer the question 
on the social signifi cance of retirement 
and how they justify their policy prefer-
ences directly and indirectly tells us what 
retirement should be in their eyes, and 
with which values and beliefs it is con-
nected. Additionally, descriptive ideas 
will be used to underpin these normative 
claims. A strong and affi rmative concept 
of retirement as mentioned above should 
go hand in hand with strong moral justi-
fi cations of retirement. While we do not 
assume that there are actors in favour of 
the ‘abolition’ of retirement as a distinct 
phase of life since it is a deeply ingrained 
feature of the modern welfare state, some 
will have a less comprehensive and elabo-
rate understanding of the latter; in this 
case, explicit justifi cations of retirement 
should be absent or relativised by com-
peting values and beliefs. Whichever form 
references to values and beliefs take, they 
have to refer to the stock of ideas that con-
stitutes the related welfare culture; and of 
course, the actors’ arguments necessarily 
need to relate to the existing structure of 
the pension system.
6. The Unions’ View: Retirement as a Social 
Right under Threat 
Both the German Deutscher Gewerk-
schaftsbund (DGB) and the British Trades 
Union Congress (TUC) represent member 
unions from different sectors which or-
ganise the interests of individual union 
members. They not only share a similar 
collective identity as union confedera-
tions, i.e. representatives of unions. They 
both also pursue a relatively inclusive 
policy approach guided by the value of 
solidarity and claim to represent all em-
ployees (and not just members of unions), 
or even the “common good” (“Allgemein-
wohl“, see for example DGB interview,
l. 772-773).
When asked in the interview about 
the signifi cance of retirement, the expert 
from the DGB elaborates on the statutory 
retirement age as a social norm; he under-
lines the role of retirement as a phase to-
wards which people orientate themselves 
and which people expect and look forward 
to from their fi fties onwards. This phase of 
life is supposed to be free of duties of any 
kind, it is “the phase when you are free to 
decide what to do and perhaps even free 
to decide to do nothing”18 (“die Phase, wo 
man frei entscheiden kann was man tut 
und vielleicht auch frei entscheiden kann, 
dass man nichts tut”, l. 19-20).19 The ex-
pert considers retirement as being under 
threat in several ways. One is the emerg-
ing and highly morally charged discourse 
of obliging older people to be active long-
er – which seems to imply both volunteer-
ing and working. He names several con-
servative politicians, one social-democrat 
and one academic he sees as proponents 
of such a discourse, and criticises their at-
tempts to “re-defi ne” “this free phase of 
life” (“die den Ruhestand und diese freie 
Phase des Lebens neu defi nieren wollen”, 
l. 42). The expert strongly assumes that 
not even younger people support these 
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attempts, because amongst other things 
they have to worry too much about get-
ting or staying in work before retirement 
age, about unemployment and individual 
competition in the labour market (l. 45-
49). So although the DGB welcomes any 
kind of participation in old age and is 
generally against old age discrimination, 
the expert tends to emphasise the con-
straints that older people are subject to. 
The call for more engagement is seen as 
inappropriate because, implicitly, any en-
gagement in old age should be voluntary 
and based on the freedom to do whatever 
one wants in retirement (l. 50) – a freedom 
many older people do not have, according 
to this view.
Although neither the expert nor the 
documents mention the succession of 
generations on the labour market ex-
plicitly, the related argument that many 
older people working make the labour 
market situation more diffi cult, espe-
cially for younger people, still lingers in 
some side notes in the DGB’s documents: 
Whereas in 2006 the DGB claims that the 
increase in retirement age raises the la-
bour market pressure for new entrants 
and younger employees (DGB 2006: 8), 
in 2011 this point is toned down to grow-
ing pressure on the labour market gen-
erally (DGB 2011: 6) – a reason for this 
might be the improved situation of the 
German labour market. However, in this 
document the DGB still claims more spe-
cifi cally that subsidised partial retirement 
(“Altersteilzeit“, DGB 2011: 24) makes 
it easier for young people to access the 
labour market and that the increase of 
retirement age “artifi cially” (“künstlich“) 
keeps up numbers of older workers (DGB 
2011: 7) – implying that there is a natural 
process of succession.
With the emphasis on the constraints 
that older people face when approaching 
retirement age, an important argument 
is already hinted at, namely that of many 
older people not being able to work. The 
expert discusses this when criticising the 
increase in retirement age and related 
labour market reforms which in his eyes 
pressure people into working longer (l. 
64): Most people, in the DGB’s view, are 
not able to work up to the age of 67 and 
many not even up to 65, because they are 
not in good health or only have poor labour 
market chances. This especially applies 
to the low-skilled (l. 128-129; DGB 2011: 
14). The resulting widening gap between 
the actual end of work and the beginning 
of pension payments poses another threat 
to retirement as a phase free of duties be-
cause such a gap coincides with reduced 
pension payments due to deductions in 
the case of retirement before statutory 
retirement age. Consequently, the expert 
states, people have to worry about old age 
poverty and a decent standard of living in 
old age (see also DGB 2011: 3), which will 
be aggravated by future cuts in the level 
of social insurance pensions following the 
recent reforms. Correspondingly, the DGB 
position on pensions, in particular as re-
corded in its offi cial statements, focuses 
on the level of pensions (DGB 2011, 2006: 
2). It explicitly disapproves of the reform 
aim of stabilising contribution rates, 
which, according to the DGB, has been 
given too much importance and threatens 
to destabilise social insurance pensions. 
The latter constitute a reliable system “on 
which people can count” (“etwas womit 
die Menschen rechnen können”, l. 182-
183). This output-orientation with regard 
to public pensions underlines the impor-
tance of retirement as a secure phase of 
life which allows people the freedom to do 
as they please.
The expert’s position on work beyond 
retirement age mirrors his view on retire-
ment in general. Asked about why some 
people work in old age, he summarises 
that “some want to, the others have to” 
(“die einen wollen, die anderen müs-
sen”, l. 409) and states that there is little 
evidence on the subject. He elaborates on 
possible reasons, includes social reasons 
(such as social contacts) and the potential 
mix of fi nancial and non-material reasons. 
Despite this conscientious and balanced 
view, he stresses that the cases of working 
pensioners he personally knows all work 
because of “damn low” pensions (“dass 
die Renten verdammt niedrig sind”,
l. 432). Here, he even refers to examples 
from his own family (l. 430-438) and re-
iterates knowing nobody who continues 
to work voluntarily while having a good 
pension. Evaluating the trend of increased 
work beyond retirement age, the expert 
states that in his opinion it is very risky 
and missing the point (“verfehlt“) to think 
that employment in old age could help 
tackle old age poverty (l. 423-430, again 
438-439).
For the UK, the expert from the British 
Trades Union Congress (TUC) underlines 
that there is “a long standing trade union 
commitment to a poverty free retirement 
as a right for everyone” (l. 33); entering 
retirement is something people expect to 
do at some point, “a goal” (l. 43). His main 
concern is that this right is not available 
for everyone – so like the DGB, the TUC 
sees retirement under threat. In this con-
text, the TUC also opposes the increase 
of retirement age (to 68 in the long run), 
based on a similar argument as the DGB: 
In order to differentiate between groups 
in the population who can work until 67 
and those who cannot, he emphasises the 
unequal distribution of healthy life expec-
tancy (l. 36-38). This is also an issue in the 
TUC documents we studied. According to 
this view, healthy life expectancy in par-
ticular has not improved a lot (if at all) for 
many members of the working class. This 
underlines, on the one hand, the injustice 
of raising the state pension age. On the 
other hand, it ties in with the claim that 
many older people are not able to work 
longer. As most leave the workforce earli-
er than state pension age and “involuntar-
ily” (l. 203) because of their health or age 
discrimination, the gap between the ac-
tual end of paid employment and the start 
of pension payments is growing. Thus the 
TUC is in favour of measures that combat 
old age discrimination and supports age 
management policies which are aimed at 
enabling people or making it easier for 
them to work up to state pension age (l. 
200-219).
This is complemented by a perspec-
tive on pensions which focuses more on 
the provision level and less on the stabi-
lisation or reduction of contribution rates 
and costs. In the UK, this ‘output-orien-
tation’ in pensions relates to both a rise 
and other improvements in the state pen-
sion (see also TUC 2008: 2) and improve-
ments in occupational pension schemes, 
especially their stricter regulation. Here, 
the TUC supports the establishment of a 
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default occupational pension scheme and 
automatic enrolment for workplace pen-
sions (l. 60-62). These measures are all 
seen in the context of high old age pov-
erty in the UK – to combat this poverty 
is one of the central goals of the TUC’s 
pension policies, as demonstrated in the 
above quote.
The TUC generally welcomes the abo-
lition of the default retirement age and 
the right to continue working and has re-
corded this in several press releases (TUC 
2011a, d). However, the expert underlines 
that this decision has to be a “genuine 
voluntary choice” (l. 119), and implicitly 
doubts that most people who work do it 
because it is their free choice (see also 
TUC 2011d). Therefore, it is not the TUC’s 
main worry that people who desire to 
work beyond retirement age are not given 
this opportunity (by their employer, for 
example), although the TUC is of course 
in favour of allowing them to do so. In 
their view, however, “it’s far more impor-
tant to ensure that people have got a right 
to retire at 65, there’s far more people in 
need who are affected by not having that 
right than are affected by being forced to 
retire early” (l. 115-117). This perspective 
also shapes the TUC’s evaluation of post 
retirement work which the expert identi-
fi es as “one of the ways of dealing with 
old age poverty” on the individual level 
(l. 418). Accordingly, he cites inadequate 
pensions as the most common reason to 
continue working, and refers to women 
in particular. Turning to motivation that 
does not involve money, the expert points 
out that there is a group of people who 
“love their jobs and don’t want to leave 
them” (l. 398), and going on tongue-in-
cheek he states that “mostly they’re jour-
nalists writing articles for the newspapers 
and magazines about pensions” (l. 401-
402). Asked about the journals they write 
for, he mentions the Financial Times and 
The Daily Telegraph, and although this is 
not a completely serious part of the con-
versation, he implies that the trend where 
people desire to work longer for other 
than fi nancial reasons is exaggerated by 
the conservative and market-liberal press.
All in all, the British and the German 
union confederations have a very similar 
view on retirement in that they stress the 
social right to this phase of life, which is 
threatened by recent policies regarding 
pensions and statutory pension age. Their 
positions do not include an explicit refer-
ence to ‘deserving’ this right after a long 
working career (and corresponding pen-
sion contributions) – which is somewhat 
surprising in the German case.20 If at all, 
this argument can only be found in under-
tones. Both actors stress that many older 
people cannot work longer, thus underlin-
ing the protective function of retirement. 
Whereas the DGB still (at least implicitly) 
establishes a link between longer careers 
of older people and the labour market 
chances of younger people, the TUC ex-
plicitly rejects this argument in one of its 
press releases (TUC 2011c). Minor differ-
ences in the argument made by the two 
confederations relate to their take on what 
exactly jeopardises retirement as a social 
right, apart from their shared perception 
that most people cannot and should not 
be obliged or pushed to work longer: 
Whereas the British TUC’s position fo-
cuses more strongly on old age poverty, 
including in a work beyond retirement 
age context, for the DGB expert poverty 
is only one among several points. Addi-
tionally, he mentions the discourse aimed 
at obliging retired people to volunteer 
and contribute in further ways to society. 
Whereas the British expert calls for a pov-
erty-free retirement, the German expert 
goes further in his demands: retirement 
should not only be poverty-free but also 
free of any duties, if the retiree so wishes. 
His rejection of the discourse of obligation 
suggests that he has a somewhat stronger 
view on what retirement should be – a 
view that corresponds to what is incorpo-
rated more in the German welfare culture 
than in its British counterpart. This ten-
dency towards a more modest defi nition 
of retirement in the UK of course also mir-
rors the more pressing problems of old 
age poverty. Among the constraints that 
both organisations mention as restrict-
ing older people’s individual choices and 
their scope of action and as areas calling 
for responsible action by employers and 
governments, both refer to health and dif-
fi cult conditions for older workers within 
companies and on the labour market, in-
cluding old age discrimination.
7. The Employers’ View: (Fixed) Retirement as 
Outdated and Costly
The German Bundesvereinigung der 
Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände (BDA – 
Confederation of German Employers’ As-
sociations) and the Confederation of Brit-
ish Industry (CBI) represent the interests 
of the employers, the BDA as umbrella or-
ganisation of the employer organisations 
of different industries, the CBI as a mem-
ber organisation. Both experts refer to the 
interests of their members; at the same 
time, both underline that what is good 
for the employers is good for economic 
growth which ultimately benefi ts society 
as a whole, for example in the form of 
low unemployment rates. Put otherwise, 
‘good’ (i.e. employer-friendly) economic 
and labour market policies, such as low 
labour costs, deregulation etc. constitute 
the best social policy and are key to the 
population’s welfare, including that of 
older and retired people (see for exam-
ple BDA interview l. 475-481; BDA 2009, 
2010; CBI interview l. 738-747, 784-803).
Asked about the social signifi cance of 
retirement, the expert from the German 
BDA, after a longer moment of refl ection, 
seems to talk less about the phase of re-
tirement itself than about the transition 
into retirement. Underlining that this is 
a spontaneous and not thought-through 
statement, he defi nes retirement as
“a very classical concept [...] which 
basically draws a dividing line be-
tween employment and retirement, a 
concept which is basically very out-
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dated, I would say, so the idea that 
one eventually, from a certain age 
onwards, which is even defi ned by 
the legislator and not by oneself, vir-
tually withdraws from one’s occu-
pational activity, or must withdraw 
and then suddenly ceases doing 
anything at all, this is actually not 
the concept which we as BDA have 
at the back of our minds [con-
tinues and talks about improved 
health of people in pension age to-
day], and in this respect of course 
the question arises, also given the 
demographic changes with quali-
fi ed employees becoming scarce, 
whether such a stubborn age limit 
or [...] such an abrupt exit from 
working, whether this is still ap-
propriate today.” (l. 41-52).21 
As can be seen from the citation, the 
BDA’s ‘concept’ of retirement does not 
contain a substantive idea on what re-
tirement as a distinct life phase is, but 
is shaped by labour market-related re-
fl ections. Although he has been asked 
about the social signifi cance of the phase 
of retirement (which is clearer with the 
German word “Ruhestand“ used here, 
which literally means ‘status of rest’), the 
expert’s statement that retirement is out-
dated is probably predominantly related 
to the process of retirement, as the rest 
of the citation suggests. Additionally to 
this critique of age limits as infl exible and 
“stubborn“ (the original German word 
usually being used to describe a person-
al characteristic), he later mentions the 
BDA’s general disapproval of age limits, 
as these are opposed to the organisation’s 
“liberal view on society” (“freiheitliches 
Gesellschaftsbild”,  l. 578).
Correspondingly, the BDA welcomes 
the emerging shift to a system in which 
the funding principle becomes relatively 
more important for pensions (compared 
to the still dominating pay-as-you-go 
principle) and in which individuals them-
selves are primarily responsible for their 
livelihood after pension age (l. 776-779). 
This matches policy preferences in which 
a stable or decreased level of pension con-
tribution rates takes priority over the level 
of pension provision. Therefore, the BDA 
clearly favours increasing the pension age 
and the recent policies to cut the (future) 
level of pension provision, and would also 
prefer a system which concentrates on ba-
sic income security in old age (l. 671, 779-
781; BDA 2005: 3, 11). Asked about old 
age poverty in Germany, the expert sees 
this as a minor problem, now and in the 
future, provided that policies to reduce 
pension levels and increase the state pen-
sion age are sustained in order to make 
the pension system more viable (l. 438-
481, BDA 2010). At the same time, both 
the expert and the BDA documents ad-
here to and would even like to strengthen 
the ‘equivalence principle’ in the German 
social insurance pension. This principle 
implies that people whose pension contri-
butions were higher and more continuous 
also receive higher pension payments. 
This is justifi ed with reference to individ-
ually acquired rights and to merit-based 
justice (see for example l. 669-679; BDA 
2005: 3), and goes hand in hand with dis-
approval of most re-distributive pension 
components which are not based on con-
tributions. 
This line of reasoning is furthermore 
embedded in a very positive view on older 
people’s capabilities. Already when asked 
about the signifi cance of retirement at the 
beginning of the interview, the expert re-
fers to the improved health of older people 
today in comparison to the past (l. 47-50; 
BDA 2011: 2) which is also why the in-
crease in the state pension age is not seen 
as a problem: Most older people, in the 
view of the BDA, are able to work longer, 
and very many also want to work longer. 
So, according to this view, the prolonga-
tion of working lives should not be a prob-
lem at all for most people and occupa-
tions, provided a number of measures and 
changes are realised, such as changed at-
titudes of all involved parties, the fl exibi-
lisation of age limits including the fl exible 
combination of pension receipt and em-
ployment earnings, continued education 
and learning, and the adaptation of work-
places to the ageing of the labour force 
(BDA 2009, 2010). Rejecting too strict and 
infl exible regulations by the state in these 
areas (BDA 2009), the BDA sees many of 
these measures as the shared responsibil-
ity of employers and unions (l. 215-222), 
but also as requiring the active participa-
tion of (older) employees. Individual re-
sponsibility is also stressed with regard to 
health, which “is an indispensable foun-
dation for working up to legal retirement 
age, and beyond that where applicable” 
(“eine unverzichtbare Grundlage für Er-
werbstätigkeit bis zum gesetzlichen Rent-
enalter und gegebenenfalls auch darüber 
hinaus”, BDA 2009: 5).
These perceptions also determine the 
evaluation of post-retirement work by the 
expert. Asked why people might still work 
beyond retirement age, he fi rst refers to 
his father who still works despite being 
of retirement age, because he enjoys his 
work and the feeling of being needed (l. 
531-534), very much in contrast to the 
example cited by the expert from the Ger-
man union. He then mentions a number 
of non-fi nancial reasons why people gen-
erally stay in or go back to employment: 
fun, not wanting to feel useless and old, 
the meaning of their work or work as a 
purpose in life, social contacts, the diffi -
culty of stopping work from one day to an-
other, and social recognition (l. 539-543). 
Only after all these reasons does he touch 
on potential fi nancial reasons and at the 
same time distances himself from the “ad-
vocates of the thesis of old age poverty” 
(“Verfechter der Altersarmutsthese”) 
who “probably say that people will go 
working in droves because they simply 
cannot afford this anymore”22 (“werden 
wahrscheinlich sagen, die Leute werden 
scharenweise arbeiten gehen, weil sie 
sich das sonst schlichtweg nicht mehr 
leisten können”, l. 543-545); only at the 
end, he briefl y relativises his statement 
and says that earning extra might play 
a role for “one or the other” (“den einen 
oder andern”, l. 545-546).
The general position of the British 
Confederation of British Industry (CBI) is 
similar to that of the BDA. One important 
point of difference is the CBI’s great con-
cern about the abolition of the DRA in the 
UK (CBI 2010). Even more clearly than 
the German expert, the CBI representa-
tive relates the question about the social 
signifi cance of retirement mainly to the 
transition to retirement (with the word 
‘retirement’ meaning both the process of 
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retiring and the resultant state). He states 
that the CBI does not “necessarily like to 
talk about retirement as a sort of black 
and white situation. We think that there 
is some moment in time where obviously 
people are living longer and therefore it 
is natural that people will work longer” (l. 
28-30) – although this does not necessari-
ly mean that a 65-year old has to work like 
a 30-year old, for example with regard to 
the hours worked. Whilst the CBI is in fa-
vour of increasing the state pension age, 
extending working lives and fl exibilising 
the transition into retirement, the organi-
sation regards the abolition of the DRA as 
problematic. According to this view, the 
DRA, which had only been implemented 
in 2006 (and was being phased out at the 
time of the interview in 2011), facilitated 
succession planning for the companies 
because it enabled them to dismiss peo-
ple reaching state pension age if they 
did not perform well enough to continue 
working, for example. The expert clarifi es 
that the majority of people who wanted 
to continue working under the old DRA 
framework were actually allowed to do 
so by their employers. By contrast, under 
the new, completely individualised retire-
ment regulations, the employers have to 
give a reason if they want to dismiss older 
people reaching retirement age, a process 
which the employers perceive as diffi cult 
and (too) complicated (l. 143-151), the 
expert reports; also, potential tribunal 
claims interfere with good employer-em-
ployee relationships (CBI 2010: 8). Fur-
thermore, the old regulations also ben-
efi tted employees because they enabled 
them to “retire with dignity” and without 
a “long and arduous” performance man-
agement process (CBI 2010: 8). So al-
though the CBI sees older workers as ca-
pable of working longer, they at the same 
time link “age and performance”, and 
feel that the fact that some older workers 
do not perform well anymore should be 
acknowledged (CBI 2010: 3). Because of 
the link between old age and performance 
and the practical diffi culties of succession 
management without the DRA, they try to 
defend the employers’ power to dismiss 
poor-performing people at retirement 
age (CBI 2010: 10). In the interview this 
argument takes an interesting twist: The 
expert regards this link between age and 
performance as stronger in the cohort 
currently reaching retirement age, as 
they are less well educated and capable of 
learning, in contrast to future retirees who 
will be much better educated. In this way, 
he can insist on the benefi ts of the (abol-
ished) DRA and still reconcile this with his 
stance that the increased state pension 
age will not pose a problem in the future 
(l. 261-273).
Like the BDA, the CBI is more con-
cerned about the contributions to and the 
costs of pensions than about the level of 
provision. The CBI generally underlines 
that people “should take responsibility 
for their retirement and take ownership 
of the tools that would allow them to save 
adequately for a pension” (CBI 2011: 1). 
Among these tools, occupational pen-
sions play an important role, and the CBI 
acknowledges the employers’ shared re-
sponsibility for this tool, while at the same 
time expressing their worries about too 
much regulation in this area (CBI 2009). 
The ultimate responsibility for pensions 
is nonetheless seen as lying with the indi-
vidual. When elaborating on this highly in-
dividualised notion of retirement, he stipu-
lates that the individual has to prepare 
fi nancially for retirement – a task that eve-
rybody wanting to retire has to fulfi l: “ulti-
mately the employee is the one who has to 
think retirement is important” (l. 701). 
Nevertheless, the expert recognises 
that the UK has a problem with old age 
poverty. The CBI therefore welcomes the 
(planned) reforms of the state pension23 
which would simplify the system, make it 
more transparent, and increase the level 
of provision. Based on this stable foun-
dation, individuals would then be able 
to effectively plan their occupational and 
private pension provision (l. 553-563). 
However, the expert also admits that pen-
sioner poverty is not a policy area which 
the CBI deals with a lot, and states that 
these problems should be addressed by 
improving pension build-up during work-
ing lives (l. 586-588).
Asked about why some people work 
beyond retirement age, the expert fi rst 
refers to the social interaction that work 
offers and the fact that for some people 
it is diffi cult to stop working from one 
day to another. Second, he elaborates on 
the economic reasons which he sees as 
closely connected to the fi nancial crisis 
in which many people lost parts of their 
retirement savings (l. 501-502). He does 
not claim that one of these two kinds of 
reasons is more important than the other. 
Nonetheless, he sees work beyond re-
tirement mostly as a matter of individual 
choice, welcomes people’s wish and abil-
ity to work longer and considers this as 
part of fl exible retirement arrangements 
which are already in operation and should 
be further supported (l. 507-513; CBI 
2009: 36).
At fi rst glance, the positions of the 
CBI and BDA seem to differ signifi cantly. 
However, many of these differences are 
due to structural and institutional differ-
ences which the actors take account of in 
their positions: Negating the existence of 
old age poverty would potentially discred-
it the CBI’s position, as there is strong 
agreement among other British actors 
and the population that old age poverty is 
a serious problem. Similarly, being in fa-
vour of a slightly improved state pension 
is only possible for the CBI because pro-
vision is very low and the existing costly 
system of means-tested benefi ts is not 
seen as a good alternative, because it is 
not effective and non-take-up is high. By 
contrast, the German situation is charac-
terised by cuts in a more generous pen-
sion system which are clearly supported 
by the BDA, whilst emphasising the role of 
individual performance and contributions.
Both actors tend to see work beyond 
retirement age as a matter of choice, and 
older people as capable of working long-
er, with those who are not being an excep-
tion. At the same time, the CBI is faced 
with a situation in which many already 
work longer, which is not the case in Ger-
many. While working in old age for fi nan-
cial reasons is perceived as common only 
by the British CBI, both experts regard 
working as a valid possibility of taking on 
individual responsibility for the retirement 
phase, although this is somewhat implicit 
and tentative in the German case. Howev-
er, British employers are caught between 
a rock and a hard place in this respect be-
cause at the same time they would have 
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liked to retain their power to dismiss peo-
ple by means of the (abolished) default 
retirement age. To justify this they have to 
create a link between old age and perfor-
mance, a link which is avoided by the Ger-
man BDA. The CBI also justifi es the option 
of dismissing older people with reference 
to arguments of generational succession. 
Although this relates to the practical side 
of human resource management within 
companies, in one instance (CBI 2010: 7) 
diffi culties “to plan graduate recruitment 
and apprenticeship numbers” at least on 
the company level are mentioned in con-
nection with many older employees who 
want to continue working. This is a ‘soft’ 
and meso-level version of a succession ar-
gument, which is based on the perceived 
need for “a balance between experience 
and fresh ideas” (CBI 2010: 7). Yet at the 
same time, the expert also acknowledges 
that the argument that older people stay-
ing in work longer prevent younger peo-
ple from entering the labour market has 
been proven wrong by academic research 
(l. 152-153).
On the whole, however, similarities 
between the two positions with regard to 
the concept of retirement prevail. They do 
not really feel responsible for questions 
of retirement, and neither of them has a 
strong concept of retirement as a work-
free phase of life which should be a so-
cial right. On the contrary, retirement is 
mostly seen in its function for the labour 
market: people beyond retirement age are 
a potentially useful employment reserve, 
in particular in the light of future skills 
shortages due to demographic changes. 
Furthermore, costly pension systems are 
potential barriers to economic growth. 
Even the CBI’s argument on succession 
planning is not morally loaded in the 
above mentioned way (as the ‘reciprocal’ 
act of freeing up jobs for younger people), 
it is more of a practical argument against 
letting people continue working by any 
means and automatically. Retirement is 
above all and especially in the UK an indi-
vidual (in Kohli’s sense mostly instrumen-
tal) arrangement for a work-free phase at 
the end of one’s life, but not a value or aim 
as such, or if at all, a rather out-dated one.
8. Non-Profit Interest Organisations:
Between the Right to Work-Free Retirement 
and the Right to Work 
In Germany, we interviewed the Bundes-
arbeitsgemeinschaft der Senioren-Organi-
sationen (BAGSO, approximately ‘federal 
ny’). While the BAGSO is the (federal) um-
brella for senior organisations in general 
and within political parties, unions, non-
profi t organisations etc., the SoVD does 
not explicitly or solely represent older 
people, but – according to its own mission 
statement – the interests of pensioners, 
patients, members of the statutory health 
insurance, those in need of care and disa-
bled people. De facto it is an advocate of 
poorer and disadvantaged people, with 
one, but not the sole focus on (poor) pen-
sioners. Many among the growing number 
of SoVD members belong to one of these 
groups.24 The BAGSO, by contrast, is a 
‘weak’ and cross-party umbrella organisa-
tion with only a small offi ce and very few 
staff. As they represent sub-organisations 
with very different (and in part confl icting) 
views, their positions tend to constitute a 
minimal and often very general consensus 
(Schroeder et al. 2008: 226). The BAGSO 
is also special in that it is the only case 
in our sample in which the comparison of 
the interview and the position papers has 
revealed some differences, probably be-
cause the interviewee from the BAGSO is 
not a professional expert in a strict sense 
but an older person fulfi lling a (high) hon-
orary position, very much like an honor-
ary position in politics. Correspondingly, 
the interview had a personal tone to it and 
the interviewee in part communicated her 
personal views on the themes discussed. 
For these reasons we only briefl y touch on 
the position of the BAGSO.
On the British side, we interviewed ex-
perts from the National Pensioners Con-
vention (NPC) and Age UK. Both advocate 
the interests of old people, although in 
very different ways. NPC, which is rooted 
consortium of seniors’ organisations’) 
and the Sozialverband Deutschland (SoVD, 
approximately ‘social association Germa-
in the trade union movement, represents 
British pensioners (“run by pensioners for 
pensioners”, l. 1320). Still today, its posi-
tion is close to that of the unions. Age UK 
is the largest charity for older people in 
the UK and arose from the merger of the 
charities Help the Aged and Age Concern 
in 2009. It addresses all kinds of issues 
connected with old age (such as health 
and care, pensions, old age poverty and 
volunteering), has a tight network of lo-
cal agencies and charity shops and also 
a commercial arm selling products and 
services related to old age. All in all, the 
differences between the non-profi t or-
ganisations in the two countries we have 
chosen for our analysis are quite consid-
erable. This was unavoidable because 
their specifi c ‘landscape’ of actors differs 
a lot, with Germany having only very few 
large organisations representing mainly 
or explicitly older people.
In his fi rst reaction to the question 
about the social signifi cance of retire-
ment, the expert from the Sozialverband 
Deutschland (SoVD) elaborates on the 
historical importance of retirement for 
the organisation (which was founded in 
1917) whose central clientele are pen-
sioners as well as the disabled. Only at 
the end of this answer does he state that, 
for the SoVD, “retirement is an important 
theme, if only because many people, af-
ter a fulfi lled working life, simply have an 
entitlement to enjoy the phase of retire-
ment” (“wichtiges Thema, allein deshalb 
weil viele Menschen nach einem erfüllten 
Erwerbsleben schlicht einen Anspruch 
eben darauf haben, die Ruhestandsphase 
zu genießen” l. 38-40). He goes on to say 
that the (BDA 2009) “intergenerational 
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contract“ (“Generationenvertrag“, l. 54) 
of the public pension system is still work-
ing and being accepted by the younger 
generation: according to this view, young-
er people are, on the one hand, happy to 
contribute to pensions currently being 
paid because they know that, in doing so, 
they acquire entitlements. Current pen-
sioners, on the other hand, have earned 
what is being paid to them now by fi nanc-
ing the pensions of earlier generations (l. 
47-53).
Based on this strong defi nition of what 
retirement should be, the SoVD is op-
posed to raising the statutory retirement 
age and the associated reforms regarding 
pensions, such as the current and planned 
cuts in the level of provision (SoVD 2007a, 
2012a). Its focus is very clearly on the aim 
that public pensions secure the living 
standard people had before retirement, 
thus on the level of provision and not 
contribution rates (SoVD 2012a: 14-15). 
The SoVD is in favour of more generous 
arrangements within the social insurance 
pension regarding incapacity pensions, 
times of low-wage employment, and cred-
its for times without paid work but spent 
in unemployment, with raising children or 
with providing care (SoVD 2012a). None-
theless, the SoVD emphasises that pen-
sions in the social insurance should be 
based on contributions and thus on “life 
time achievements“ (“Lebensleistung“, 
SoVD 2012a: 7, 15 – see the quote above). 
In the eyes of the SoVD, further reducing 
this relation of pensions to contributions 
is therefore not an appropriate instrument 
against rising old age poverty, which is 
seen as a serious problem, especially for 
the future. Hence over and above the more 
generous arrangements within the social 
insurance pensions system and measures 
to improve contributions during people’s 
working careers (such as minimum wages 
and more state support for rehabilitation 
after long-term illness) (SoVD 2012a), 
the SoVD calls for improvements in the 
means-tested (and tax-fi nanced) old age 
benefi ts which are not at odds with the 
basic principles of social insurance (SoVD 
2012b).
The SoVD is also against more fl exible 
rules for combining pension receipt and 
working. Currently, earning extra is sub-
ject to strict limits if a pension is drawn 
before state pension age, and many other 
actors are in favour of making these rules 
more fl exible or abolishing them altogeth-
er. According to the expert’s view, fl exi-
bilising these limits and thus facilitating 
the combination of (early) pensions and 
working income undermines the state 
pension’s role of securing a distinct phase 
after working life (l. 371-392); instead the 
SoVD proposes a more fl exible transi-
tion to retirement and recommends part-
pensions for this purpose (SoVD 2012a: 
9-10), which are conditional upon reduc-
tions in the hours worked and less prone 
to exploitation by employers.
Both the documents and the expert 
thus imply that people of pension age in 
the main are not able to continue work-
ing and that they should not be obliged to 
do so; whilst at the same time stipulating 
that work should not be denied those who 
genuinely wish to work (l. 444-447). This 
is exemplifi ed by many references to ill 
health and disablement which affect many 
older people, especially those who have 
worked in manual jobs or are otherwise 
disadvantaged. Correspondingly, the ex-
pert assumes that many people are forced 
to work beyond retirement age because 
they need the extra money. In this con-
text, he draws a connection to discontin-
uous work biographies, recent decreases 
in the level of pension provision or reduc-
tions because of early pension receipt (l. 
346-350). Despite this focus on fi nancial 
reasons for working, he also acknowl-
edges other motives such as wanting to 
stay active (l. 351-352) and believes that 
people’s motivations to continue working 
are diverse (l. 360-363).
The other German actor, the Bundes-
arbeitsgemeinschaft der Senioren-Organi-
sationen (BAGSO) has, in comparison to 
the SoVD, less strong views regarding 
the re-distributive and protective func-
tions of retirement and pensions. In re-
action to the question about the social 
signifi cance of retirement, the expert very 
generally refers to social succession – in 
a fast changing society, the replacement 
of older generations by younger ones is 
vital and necessary (l. 151-158). However, 
this point does not appear in the offi cial 
position of the BAGSO, as recorded in our 
selection of documents by the organisa-
tion. While in the interview, the increase 
in state pension age is accepted as inevi-
table because of demographic ageing, the 
theme is not mentioned at all in the docu-
ments we studied; this might indicate 
that the various sub-organisations of the 
BAGSO have not succeeded in agreeing 
on a position here. This also corresponds 
to what the expert says about how deci-
sions come about in the organisation
(l. 1116-1119).
Apart from the question of state 
pension age, pensions seem to be the 
only stronger point on which the differ-
ent members of the BAGSO were able 
to agree. They defend the ‘old’ pension 
system with its focus on maintaining the 
living standard enjoyed by an individual 
during their working life and underline 
the performance-related dimension of 
the state pension system, i.e. that higher 
contributions (thus higher occupational 
positions) are rewarded by higher pen-
sion payments in old age (‘equivalence 
principle’): lifetime achievements should 
be acknowledged in the fi rst pillar of the 
pension system (“Lebensleistung aner-
kennen“ – BAGSO 2011b). Therefore, the 
BAGSO stipulates that the level of the state 
pension should not decrease further and 
that the expansion of the second and third 
pillars, which they in general accept as 
complements to the fi rst pillar, should not 
be at the cost of the latter (BAGSO 2011b: 
5). All these measures are also seen as 
the best way to prevent old age poverty 
and combat growing income inequalities 
which are considered as imminent in the 
future. The BAGSO has a very positive 
view on the capabilities of older people, 
be it as workers, volunteers or as con-
tributing through other unpaid activities. 
This is stressed in a document which calls 
for a more positive image of older people 
in general and for “overcoming” old age 
discrimination (“…überwinden”) (BAGSO 
2011a). In this context, the BAGSO also 
generally disapproves of age limits which 
contravene the realisation of (literally: us-
ing) “the potentials of old age” (“Poten-
ziale des Alters nutzen”) (BAGSO 2011a).
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When asked about possible reasons 
why people work beyond state pension 
age, the interviewee answers that some 
people probably have to work to make 
ends meet (l. 807-811) – this corresponds 
with the BAGSO’s worries about increas-
ing old age poverty. Although the expert 
concedes that individual motives for work-
ing are diverse and some people continue 
working because they love their jobs, she 
assumes that fi nancial needs are crucial 
here and will become an even more im-
portant reason for working in the future 
(l. 812-822).
In the UK case, the expert from the 
NPC replies to the question about the 
social signifi cance of retirement with the 
statement that “there has to be, in […] a 
civilised society, a reasonable decent pe-
riod of retirement after a period of work” 
(l. 33). In his view, the UK has “lost sight” 
of this “important need for everybody” (l. 
40). He sees this period as being threat-
ened by recent UK pension policies, most 
of all by the increase in pension age and 
its overall justifi cation on the grounds of 
increasing longevity. According to his 
view, these developments are further ag-
gravated by the decreasing (real) levels 
of provision in all three occupational, pri-
vate and also public pensions (l. 567-577). 
Referring (as does the TUC) to the stark 
regional and class-related differences in 
longevity, he deplores that a “reasonable 
and decent” retirement is not the case 
when people stop working at 65 and then 
die a few years later. Because of this in-
justice and as many people are not able to 
do so, working longer is “not acceptable” 
(l. 41-42). Linked to this, the NPC asserts 
that “life expectancy projections and the 
capability to continue working well be-
yond 65 have […] been grossly over exag-
gerated [sic]” (NPC 2011: 3).
In further justifying the importance 
of retirement, the expert cites the “con-
tribution older people make to society 
after they’ve fi nished working” (l. 48-49), 
through volunteering, looking after chil-
dren, providing care to other people and 
other unpaid activities. Adding the taxes 
paid by older people and offsetting this 
with what is spent for pensioners (for ex-
ample in health care) the net contribution 
of pensioners is at £ 40 billion every year, 
he argues (l. 57, also NPC 2013: 16). So 
while the NPC uses a strong defi nition of 
retirement as a distinct phase of life, they 
substantiate this concept using a genu-
inely economic argument.
Policies related to pensions and ben-
efi ts for older people are key to the NPC’s 
position because “the right to retire can 
only really be exercised when individu-
als have fi nancial security as well” (NPC 
2013: 18). So the NPC’s position is clearly 
‘output-oriented’ in that they favour a 
strong and (even more) universal public 
pension system which should be based on 
residency (of, for instance, 30 years) and 
not on contributions. Furthermore, pen-
sion payments should be above the pover-
ty-threshold. Correspondingly, the “over-
reliance on occupational schemes” in the 
British system is criticised (l. 625), since 
these are seen as defi cient in many ways.
The NPC’s focus on bettering the situ-
ation of poor pensioners also refl ects the 
expert’s take on work beyond retirement 
age. The latter is a re-occurring theme in 
the interview even when the interviewer 
has not asked about it, probably because 
the expert is aware of the focus of the re-
search project. When discussing pension 
reforms, the expert states that “we are 
seeing more people because of the low 
pensions they have needing more than 
wanting to remain in the workplace” (l. 
93-94). However, here and later in the 
interview, he also discusses non-fi nancial 
reasons for working, such as social con-
tacts, work satisfaction and recognition (l. 
95-99). He very elaborately describes that 
it is probably mostly two kinds of people 
who want to work beyond retirement age: 
those “at the very bottom” who “might 
want to keep working because their pen-
sions are so low”, and “those at the very 
top who have very nice jobs in academia 
or, you know, judges or whatever, politi-
cians”; however, the “bulk in the mid-
dle” would prefer to stop work early, he 
assumes (l. 121-123). The examples of 
working beyond retirement age the expert 
gives illustrate this polarised view – on the 
one hand there are the “school cleaner”, 
the “dinner lady” (l. 395), the “guy who’s 
digging up the road or driving the bus” (l. 
363), on the other hand “the professional, 
the journalist, bank manager, doctor” (l. 
364), and at other points in the interview 
prominent people like Richard Branson, 
Rupert Murdoch and the members of the 
House of Lords are mentioned. Whereas 
the latter groups like to work longer, the 
former are seen as being forced to work 
because they cannot afford work-free re-
tirement, and in addition to that they often 
work in not very pleasant low service jobs 
(l. 838-845).
So although the expert does not op-
pose the abolition of the DRA and concurs 
that people should be allowed to work 
longer if they wish to, he sees its abolition 
as a potentially “hollow victory” (l. 360) 
because it is not accompanied by policies 
for fi nancial security in old age, most of 
all a better state pension provision. Ac-
cording to the expert, a “real choice about 
when you retire has to be linked to fi nan-
cial security” (l. 285-286) and the abolition 
of the DRA alone does not provide such 
a real choice. This is linked to a critique 
of the “equality campaigners” (l. 353), 
amongst others Age UK, whose views on 
this are seen as incomplete. The expert 
thinks that the abolition of the DRA did not 
benefi t poorer pensioners at all, and fur-
ther argues that most people among the 
middle and upper classes who had been in 
favour of the abolition were (and still are) 
able and allowed to work longer anyway. 
It is also in this context that the prominent 
examples of older workers are mentioned. 
Finally, the expert also touches upon 
the need of generational succession in 
the context of working longer and beyond 
retirement age: he believes “that younger 
people have a right to get into the work-
place” which is why the NPC is “not pre-
pared to say ‘well pensioners should just 
go on working’” (l. 115-117, also NPC 
2011: 13). More generally referring to the 
connection between social progress and 
generational succession, he continues 
“if our society is gonna develop, young 
people have to have an opportunity to get 
into the workplace and that's important“
(l. 119-120).
All in all, the NPC clearly conceives of 
retirement as a social right and sees it as 
both a value in itself and a necessity be-
cause many people cannot work longer. 
While also justifying retirement economi-
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cally in actual amounts of money and at-
tributing this to “a positive view on older 
people” (l. 976-977), he at the same time 
criticises that in the UK paid work is per-
ceived as the most valuable contribution 
to society, even in retirement (l. 714-734; 
also NPC 2011: 13). He acknowledges that 
this line of reasoning is somewhat contra-
dictory (l. 976-1001).
The position represented by Age UK 
differs clearly from that of the NPC, as 
Age UK’s focus is more on work-related 
policies for older people than on pensions. 
Asked about the signifi cance of retire-
ment, the expert describes it as a “huge 
phase of one’s life” that is “going to be 
relevant for the vast majority of people”. 
This is the reason why “getting it right, 
providing people with the right opportuni-
ties is of great social importance, and in-
creasingly economic importance as more 
people combine work with retirement” 
(l. 24-27). Although the interviewer does 
not ask what this rather open descrip-
tion might mean, this becomes clearer 
in the course of the interview. Generally, 
the expert sees the British government’s 
policy of “getting people to work longer” 
as a “good thing” (l. 45-46), and Age UK 
generally accepts the need to raise the 
state pension age because of increasing 
longevity (Age UK 2011a: 3). However, 
this acceptance sounds somewhat more 
reluctant (“it is reasonable to consider in-
creases to State Pension age and longer 
working lives”, Age UK 2011f: 1) in con-
texts where the speeding up of the age in-
crease for women (Age UK 2011a) or the 
later general increase to 67 is criticised 
(Age UK 2011f). 
More generally and in the light of 
“health inequalities and inequalities of 
life expectancy” (l. 46-47), the expert sees 
the government charged with provid-
ing the right circumstances for working 
longer. This implies policies promoting 
workplace adaptations and training pos-
sibilities for older workers, health-related 
measures in the workplace, and address-
ing the inequalities mentioned. So on the 
one hand, government should be “em-
powering people to work longer” whilst 
on the other hand “providing safeguards 
for those that can’t” (l. 618-619), such as 
those on low incomes and in manual jobs. 
The expert deplores the fact that these 
safeguards have been weakened, as for 
example employment support allowance 
and subsidised possibilities to retrain 
older people. Furthermore, Age UK is in 
favour of a higher level of payments in 
the basic State Pension (Age UK 2012). 
This should “provide a secure platform 
on which to build private saving”, whose 
general importance is accepted here. 
Thus both improvements in the regula-
tion of private and occupational pensions 
as well as in the state pension are seen 
as crucial to tackle old age poverty (Age 
UK 2011f). Moreover, Age UK stresses the 
importance of striking “the right balance 
between supporting lower income groups 
and rewarding contributions”, thus men-
tioning the relation of pension claims to 
contributions more explicitly than the 
NPC (Age UK 2012).
In general, Age UK underlines that 
(most) older people are capable of work-
ing and there should therefore be a more 
positive view of them in society. The ex-
pert is proud of Age UK’s successful cam-
paign for the abolition of the DRA, as the 
latter contravened the “notions of choice 
and economic independence [...] which 
are really important in a modern liberal 
democracy”, and “now people can choose 
when they retire rather than being told 
that they’re gonna retire” (l. 233-235). 
So the idea of any fi xed retirement age, 
i.e. “the notion of protecting older people 
by stopping them from working it doesn’t 
matter what age it’s at, 65 or 70, it’s a 
fl awed idea” in the eyes of the expert (l. 
342-343). When the interviewer uses the 
term “retirement age”, the expert even 
corrects him, in order to emphasise that 
there is no legal or normative obligation 
to stop working, and any regulation based 
on a fi xed age can only refer to (state) 
pension receipt (l. 513-515; also Age UK 
2010: 7).
With regard to work beyond retire-
ment age, the expert is at pains to state 
that there is “confl icting evidence”. He 
reckons that most people work because 
of fi nances, but also mentions “social rea-
sons” as the other “common reason” (l. 
520-525). The latter, according to his as-
sessment, is more important for men than 
women, because men defi ne themselves 
more strongly by their work identity. Al-
though the expert acknowledges that 
many people work beyond retirement age 
for fi nancial reasons, he does not see this 
as worrying. Work is seen more in terms 
of “empowerment” (l. 594). Accordingly, 
he bemoans the fact that people “are 
self-stereotyping and feeling guilty about 
working longer” (l. 580) and underlines 
that they simply “have a right to work” (l. 
595). Age UK also clearly rejects any ar-
guments related to the importance of gen-
erational succession and freeing up jobs 
for the younger. For this purpose, the ex-
pert (l. 350-352, see also Age UK 2011b) 
refers to evidence from macroeconomic 
research, the “lump of labour fallacy”, 
which proves that there is not a defi ned 
amount of jobs in which older workers 
simply replace the younger ones, or vice 
versa – so older workers do not generally 
block the jobs of the younger.
All in all, all four non-profi t organisa-
tions represent the interests of pension-
ers; however they do so in very different 
ways and with very different foci: The 
German SoVD and the British NPC op-
pose most of the recent reforms, defend a 
strong and meaningful concept of retire-
ment and also underline that very many 
people approaching state pension age are 
not able to continue working, either up to 
the (new) state pension age or beyond. 
Accordingly, working beyond retirement 
age should not become normality. SoVD 
and NPC see themselves as advocates of 
disadvantaged and poor pensioners, and 
working pensioners who work solely for 
non-fi nancial reasons do not belong to 
this core clientele. However, over and 
above many arguments that are also 
used by the SoVD (for example regard-
ing inequalities and imminent pensioner 
poverty), the NPC also refers to the real 
economic value of retirement, generated 
through unpaid activities, paid taxes etc. 
This line of reasoning can be interpreted 
as a concession to a more liberal welfare 
regime in which justifying retirement 
purely as a social right is not suffi cient to 
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legitimate it as a work-free phase of life. 
Whereas the German BAGSO stresses 
retirement as a reward for a working life 
which is institutionally incorporated in 
the traditional German pension regime, 
Age UK sees the ‘empowering’ right to 
work as key to the wellbeing of many pen-
sioners. This is combined with demands 
to better protect those who cannot work 
beyond retirement age and those who 
are prone to poverty in old age. The posi-
tions of Age UK and the NPC both exem-
plify the confl ict that arises between the 
task of advocating the interests of their 
members and at the same time linking 
the argument to the dominating welfare 
culture and moral economy of retirement. 
The NPC in particular spells out a com-
prehensive concept of retirement as a dis-
tinct phase of life which should be a social 
right for everyone. However, the expert 
at the same time embeds this in a (more) 
liberal welfare culture in which individual 
responsibility takes priority over collec-
tive regulation and in which retirement is 
above all a question of costs. He does this 
by referring to the economic value of the 
contributions that retirees make, an argu-
ment which potentially undermines the 
idea of retirement as a social right. The 
view of Age UK is, in comparison, clos-
er to seeing retirement in the context of 
work as a (civil) right, while at the same 
time containing elements of a stronger 
concept of retirement, such as a more 
generous old age provision. 
In the German social insurance sys-
tem, collective regulation still plays a 
stronger role – though less than it used to. 
For the German non-profi t actors it is thus 
easier to substantiate a strong concept of 
a social right to work-free retirement be-
cause such a concept is part of the tradi-
tional set-up of the German pension sys-
tem. At the same time, both the BAGSO 
and, in a more general and loose way, the 
SoVD connect their comparably inclusive 
approach to the emphasis on contribu-
tions and the equivalence principle that 
is ingrained in the German system. If this 
point was spelled out (which it is not), it 
would actually make the SoVD’s approach 
less inclusive, in particular in comparison 
to the ambitious concept of retirement 
that it pursues. The (civil) right to contin-
ue working only plays a negligible role for 
the German actors.
9. Conclusions
This exploratory study was aimed at re-
constructing the concepts of retirement 
important actors refer to, explicitly or im-
plicitly, when arguing their position with 
regard to pensions and labour market pol-
paid employment. Furthermore, we as-
sumed that form and content of these 
moral justifi cations of retirement will vary 
according to the specifi c actor’s interest 
and the welfare culture they belong to. 
Our analysis necessarily had to be selec-
tive with regard to the range of actors in-
cluded and the details of their positions. 
In particular, we did not take account of 
the internal differentiation of (subsets 
of) actors, for example the unions whose 
positions are more heterogeneous than 
shown here (see for example Flynn et al. 
2013). Moreover, the comparability of the 
selected actors is limited at least in the 
case of the non-profi t interest organisa-
tions, which is due to country differences 
in the ‘landscape’ of actors. We have also 
concentrated on moral ideas connected to 
the life phase of retirement and thus the 
moral economy of retirement; more gen-
eral moral ideas related to pensions or the 
broader moral economy could not be dis-
cussed in great detail. Nonetheless, these 
more general ideas are important in indi-
rectly shaping concepts of individual life 
courses and related policy outcomes and 
are worth further detailed investigation.
Our analysis has demonstrated how 
justifi cations of retirement are in fact ap-
plied, exemplifi ed, weighed and connect-
ed to each other by different actors in the 
two welfare cultures of Germany and the 
UK, and thus how competing beliefs and 
values are negotiated in the fi eld of old 
age policies. Not all actors have a strong 
and substantive concept of retirement. In 
particular, retirement as a distinct phase 
of life does not mean a lot to the employ-
ers. Although they are far from opposing 
the still accepted idea of a work-free life 
icies for older people. Our starting point 
was the heuristic assumption that retire-
ment as a distinct, work-free phase of life 
needs to be justifi ed morally in societies 
where people’s lives are organised around 
phase in old age, they subordinate their 
reasoning about it to what is benefi cial 
in terms of macroeconomic functioning. 
Consequently, they call for reforms which 
make the transition to retirement more 
fl exible and reduce its costs for the em-
ployers. The other actors all use a mix of 
the arguments mentioned in the fi rst part 
of the paper in order to justify retirement. 
Retirement as a social right is strongly 
advocated by the unions, who see this 
particular right under threat by recent 
reforms (in the case of Germany) or by 
a deplorable state of the pension system 
which calls for reforms (in the case of the 
UK). This coincides with a focus on the 
‘output’ side of pensions, i.e. on their level 
and distribution. Similar views are shared 
by most non-profi t actors, although the 
German BAGSO and Age UK have a some-
what more moderate take on retirement. 
In many cases, these actors at the same 
time refer to retirement as ‘deserved’ af-
ter a long working career. Most of these 
references, which occur more frequently 
in the German system of social insurance, 
are nonetheless short and formulaic (such 
as the German reference to “lifetime 
achievements“ – “Lebensleistung“), and 
never substantiated with regard to who 
should be excluded on these grounds.
References to arguments of succession 
never take centre stage in the arguments 
of the actors, except perhaps for Age UK 
who takes a decisive stance against the la-
bour market-related argument that older 
people block jobs of younger people. The 
German DGB, the British CBI, the Ger-
man seniors’ organisation BAGSO and the 
British NPC all mention succession argu-
ments in passing, either in a very general 
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way or with regard to practical aspects, or 
by insinuating that older workers should 
free-up jobs for younger ones at least 
when (youth) unemployment is high.
The evaluation of post-retirement 
work by the experts in all cases corre-
sponds to their take on retirement. While 
all experts acknowledge the variety of rea-
sons that exist for working in retirement, 
most of them accentuate those reasons 
that suit their (weak or strong) take on 
retirement, i.e. either the non-fi nancial or 
the fi nancial ones. For example, the un-
ions particularly refer to fi nancial reasons, 
and the employers concentrate on non-
fi nancial reasons. This also applies to the 
examples the experts cite to prove their 
point and to make their argument more 
concrete. None of the experts is in favour 
of legal age limits for working25 or is op-
posed to letting people work who would 
like to do so. However, for many of those 
stressing the social right to work-free re-
tirement, this question of being ‘allowed’ 
to continue working is more of a side is-
sue which they do not see as a pressing 
problem.
Table 1 summarises how the concept 
of retirement is systematically associated 
with the most important related (varie-
ties of) ideas that we have reconstructed. 
The latter include both normative ideas of 
what should be (done) – which are at the 
centre of the actors’ positions – as well as 
descriptive ideas of what is assumed to be 
true or real. It is important to understand 
this ‘alignment’ or specifi c clustering 
of the concept of retirement and related 
ideas as changeable, though not arbitrary; 
furthermore, the layout of the table con-
veys the fact that the contrasting ideas 
and arguments should be understood as 
part of a continuous range, not as exclu-
sive categories. Less important ideas that 
concept of retirement 
weak           strong
retirement sub-ordinated to 
other principles, such as 
economic functioning  
(or to work as a civil right) 
 justification:  
retirement 
deserved by a 
(long) working 
life 
justification: 
retirement as a 
social right for 
all 
 
associated ideas
pension policy preferences
input orientation  
(costs)  
output orientation
(level of pensions) 
posited responsibility for old age provision
individual  collective
perception of older people
predominantly healthy and 
capable  
frequently incapable of working 
due to poor health, potentially 
vulnerable 
view on post-retirement work
mostly non-financial reasons – 
not a problem, potentially 
trendsetting 
 financial reasons dominate – deplorable exception 
Table 1:  Concepts of retirement and associated ideas
 (own compilation)
are not used in a systematic way (in par-
ticular what we have described as succes-
sion arguments) are not included.
Our analysis was also aimed at explor-
ing the relationship between the actors’ 
positions and interests on the one hand, 
and the welfare cultures they belong to 
on the other. By and large, the differences 
in how retirement is justifi ed are stronger 
between the actors than between welfare 
cultures; in other words: the moral argu-
ments of the same kind of actor (especial-
ly employers and unions) from different 
countries are more similar to each other 
than the positions of different actors with-
in one country. However, the actors have 
to refer to the institutions and ideas that 
characterise the German or British wel-
fare culture. Yet these differences rarely 
appear as consistent chains of reasoning, 
but only as partly diverging blocks in the 
‘building’ of the specifi c argument – such 
as the stronger reference to retirement 
being deserved by a long working career 
in Germany or the more individualised 
responsibility for a secure old age in the 
UK. In line with this more ‘individualised’ 
reasoning in the UK, some actors (such 
as the TUC and the NPC) refer to unequal 
individual life expectancies which make 
the increase in retirement age unfair. This 
argument is uncommon among German 
actors who instead refer to differences 
in the ability to work until retirement 
age between different occupations. This 
country difference is also due to different 
situational contexts, as linking retirement 
age to life expectancy is being discussed 
as a policy option in the UK, but not in 
Germany.
Another example which illustrates 
differing welfare-cultural references is 
the economic justifi cation of retirement 
used by the British NPC. German actors 
also mention voluntary productive ac-
tivities by older people, but with different 
underlying arguments: The BAGSO, not 
completely dissimilar to the NPC at fi rst 
glance, conveys a positive image of older 
people by stressing in how many ways 
they contribute socially, but without quan-
tifying these contributions and combined 
with a traditional take on retirement. The 
German DGB, by contrast, criticises the 
discourse of ‘active ageing’ which tends 
to morally oblige older people to continue 
to be active. A further example which re-
fl ects British welfare culture can be seen 
in the emphasis placed by Age UK on 
there being no such thing as a retirement 
age, just a state pension age, which ex-
emplifi es a weaker concept of retirement. 
This is also based on a less standardised 
notion of the transition to retirement in 
the UK, in which withdrawing from work 
and starting to receive a pension are seen 
as two different transitions – which is also 
factually more often true in the UK. The 
right to continue working is generally 
stressed more clearly in the UK, with this 
being mainly driven by Age UK and the 
debate around the abolition of the DRA.
All these differences, however, con-
stitute diverging tendencies in the moral 
justifi cation of retirement rather than dif-
ferent lines of reasoning altogether, also 
because the actors’ positions cut right 
across the country differences. The com-
monalities may also indicate that the 
German and the British welfare regimes 
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overlap in their stock of ideas because, 
ultimately, they are both modern Western 
welfare states, belong to an increasingly 
interconnected Europe and both have to 
adapt to ageing populations. Additionally, 
recent reforms in Germany have moved its 
welfare system into a more liberal direc-
tion. How the moral ideas on specifi c life 
phases which we have described here us-
ing the example of retirement will impact 
the political process and its outcomes is 
an open question for further research. Our 
results indicate that the interpretation of 
moral principles and the justifi cation of 
substantial life-course related norms are 
relatively fl exible and open. Thus ground-
breaking reforms (in particular resulting 
in retrenchment) can at least be success-
fully backed or even actively promoted 
with the help of these moral arguments.
As modern welfare regimes, both 
the German and the British welfare state 
govern individual life courses temporally, 
normatively and with regard to the distri-
bution of resources. Thus the arguments 
analysed above also comprise, often im-
plicitly, judgements about what retirees or 
more generally older people are capable 
of doing or should do. Connected to the 
concept of retirement and its moral jus-
tifi cation, images emerge of older people 
as either capable and healthy, or vulner-
able and in need of protection, with these 
perceptions being the two extremes of a 
broad spectrum of images conveyed. In 
most cases, the actor’s position with re-
gard to prolonged working lives is closely 
related to the question of what side of this 
spectrum of images the actor emphasises; 
nonetheless all experts are well aware of 
the fact that older people live in a huge 
variety of individual situations regarding 
their health and vulnerability.
Traditional policies aiming at protect-
ing older people have sometimes tended 
to implicitly promote images which por-
tray older people as incapable. In this 
context, all the analysed views on retire-
ment can be seen as ideational trade-offs 
between the protection of (vulnerable) 
older people on the one hand, and, on 
the other hand, the attempt to install poli-
cies that do not discriminate against older 
people through (usually unintentional) 
stereotyping. Progress has defi nitely been 
made in more recent old age policies in 
underlining the ‘potentials’ of ageing and 
older people. Pluralised and less stereo-
typing images of old age open new pos-
sibilities of how to live (and perhaps work) 
in old age. At the same time, in light of 
persisting or even increasing inequali-
ties in old age, the protective function of 
retirement as a genuinely social achieve-
ment has not lost its relevance. Old age 
should not be reduced to its potentials for 
mostly economic-instrumental reasons 
(as for example in the discourse of ‘active 
ageing’), because this involves new forms 
of exclusion. To (re-)negotiate the balance 
between the aim of protecting older peo-
ple and the aim of realising their poten-
tials will remain a crucial task in the fi eld 
of old age policies. Whether this requires 
a re-invention (Sargent et al. 2013) of re-
tirement or not remains for the moment 
an open question.
Notes
1  This paper was written in the context of 
the Emmy Noether research group ”Work 
beyond retirement age in Germany and the 
UK” and its third subproject on moral ideas 
in debates surrounding pensions and work in 
old age. The group is funded by the German 
Science Foundation (Deutsche Forschungs-
gemeinschaft). We would like to thank an 
anonymous reviewer, Martin Kohli, Anna 
Hokema and Thomas Lux for useful com-
ments and suggestions on earlier versions 
of the paper, and Wendy Marth for excellent 
language editing.
2  If we speak of ‘work’ here and in the follow-
ing, this relates exclusively to formal and 
paid work, be it as an employee or self-
employed. Informal work such as care and 
the like is not included (although the issue of 
the relation of formal and informal work is of 
course topical with regard to pensions).
3  In the 1980s there was a wide discussion in 
Germany on whether the concept was still 
valid, because - amongst other things - early 
retirement was widespread and working 
hours kept growing shorter (see Eder 1992). 
However, as at the time, most (empirical) 
doubts positing the end of the “work society” 
can still be refuted today. In the Anglophone 
literature, a number of concepts, for example 
the “postindustrial society” are used to 
describe the changes in the organisation of 
work. However, the basic mechanisms of 
welfare distribution, its link to paid employ-
ment, and the general concept of retirement 
have not changed in any fundamental way.
4   The exact relationship between these dif-
ferent (“instrumental” and “reciprocal”) 
elements in Kohli’s argument with regard to 
normative orders is not completely clear; at 
least implicitly, these two kinds of elements 
seem to form a dichotomy of moral and non-
moral elements.
5  Like other parts of the normative order, the 
welfare order can also be justified by specific 
historical or fictitious narrations, which often 
relate to the basic foundations of the moral 
order of a society (see Forst 2013).
6  This means that there is no categorical 
and absolute boundary which determines 
whether a certain idea is either ‘central’ or 
‘marginal’. However, there are possible rela-
tive criteria for determining how ‘central’ an 
idea is in a specific welfare culture, such as 
the extent to which it is ingrained in existing 
regulations, and the frequency and intensity 
with which actors refer to this idea; for 
instance in related debates.
7   There is no space here to discuss in more 
detail the question of how institutions, ideas 
and actors’ interests are connected and can 
be differentiated. Pragmatic approaches to 
the influence of ideas on political processes 
and more consistently constructivist ap-
proaches differ in the way they answer this 
question (but see van Oorschot 2007; van Dyk 
2008; Münnich 2011a, b).
8  This does not necessarily imply that the sys-
tem must fully succeed in maintaining living 
standards for all pensioners – it is primarily 
a normative argument. However, if this aim 
is actually no longer being fulfilled for large 
parts of the population, the related moral 
legitimation will be questioned. 
9  This is by no means an exhaustive list; we 
only mention the most general and broadly 
applied arguments. See Flynn et al. (2013; 
citing Duncan et al. 2000) for a not dissimilar 
summary of arguments which is used spe-
cifically by unions (see also Kohli/Arza 2011: 
251-252).
10   In another variation of this argument, 
early retirement in 1980s Germany was also 
justified with the “specific generational life 
course” of the older cohorts at the time, as 
a “recompense for the particular hardships” 
that these older cohorts had undergone 
during WWII and directly after (Jacobs et al. 
1991: 207).
11   This is not to say that these interests or the 
identity of the actors are necessarily uniform 
and free from contradictions. Within or-
ganisations there will in almost all cases be 
conflicting interests, positions and identities 
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which are often themselves organized (as 
for example in the case of ‘wings’ of parties). 
We are not able to differentiate here between 
these different tendencies within the specific 
organisations. Instead, we concentrate on 
the position that is communicated to the 
environment of the organisation, i.e. the ‘of-
ficial’ position which will often have emerged 
as dominant as a result of internal strug-
gle. As described in section 5, the positions 
represented by the experts correspond (with 
only one exception) to the positions recorded 
in the publications of the actor. This is an 
indication that we indeed (mainly) capture 
this ‘official’ and dominating position of these 
actors and not some of the manifold views 
within the organisation, or even the per-
sonal opinion of the expert (which will often 
strongly overlap with the position of his/her 
employer).
12  For a similar line of reasoning see also 
Kaufmann 1991. Kaufmann also mentions 
different welfare “subcultures” with regard 
to the plurality of welfare cultures that we 
describe here.
13   The new government installed in late 2013 
realized a number of measures aimed at 
reducing the risk of pensioner poverty. Most 
importantly, the state pension age has been 
lowered for people who have contributed to 
the pension insurance for 45 years. From 
July 2014 onwards, they can claim the state 
pension at the age of 63 (instead of 65), with-
out any deductions. This age limit of 63 will 
then progressively increase as well, to 65, 
timed to keep pace with the general increase 
to 67. Apart from pensions due to incapacity 
and for disabled people, those who have con-
tributed to the state pension insurance for 
45 years will be the only ones with a pension 
age of 65.
14  Under the Pensions Act 2014, the abolition 
of this additional tier of the state pension 
has been decided, while the level of the new 
single-tier State Pension will rise. Further-
more (and amongst other changes), the 
increase in state pension age to 67 is brought 
forward and a framework for regular reviews 
of the state pension age has been defined.
15  In late 2013, the British conservative-liberal 
government announced plans to further 
increase the state pension age to 70 by the 
2060s, closely linking the age to rises in life 
expectancy.
16  In order to translate the German term ge-
sellschaftliche Bedeutung we have chosen the 
more general adjective ‘social’ (significance) 
and not the less common adjective ‘societal’, 
although the latter is somewhat closer to the 
German word. Despite this difference, ex-
perts generally understood the broad sense 
of the question in similar ways. In a few 
cases, this very general question took the 
experts by surprise and led to a somewhat 
uneasy beginning of the interview, but in all 
cases the interviewees were able to get into 
their stride easily.
17  Between 1989 and 2008 there was a party 
representing older people (Die Grauen – ‘the 
grey ones’); however it never reached a more 
than marginal status in politics (Schroeder et 
al. 2008: 233)
18  All German quotations have been translated 
by the authors. To ensure the precision of 
the interpretations and the translations we 
worked with the original texts as long as pos-
sible, i.e. until the final version of this paper, 
and the translations have been checked and 
(if necessary) improved by several readers 
speaking both languages.
19  Line numbers, which are indicated by 
“l.”, always refer to the expert interviews; 
references to documents are also made in 
brackets by using the abbreviated name of 
the actor, the year of the publication (and 
a letter, if there were several documents 
in one year). In order to facilitate readabil-
ity, all original quotes have been tidied up 
slightly, leaving out word fragments, word 
repetitions, meaningless hesitation sounds 
(“em”) and simple response signals from the 
interviewer (“mhm”). We have also left out 
most of the transcription marks (for example 
indicating volume or stretched vowels), 
with one exception: italics indicate that the 
speaker has emphasised the marked words.
20  This should however not be overstated and 
might be due to the fact that the DGB is the 
unions’ confederation; yet, the DGB’s plea for 
an expanded social insurance which includes 
all employees and parts of the self-employed 
(Erwerbstätigenversicherung, DGB 2011) 
further exemplifies their inclusive approach, 
which is different from the former ‘insider’-
policy of the unions. However, at least specif-
ic unions, for example that representing the 
employees in the metal industries (which we 
have interviewed as well, but not analysed 
here), still have a position which emphasises 
more explicitly that pensions are deserved by 
a long working life and should be based on 
the equivalence-principle (higher contribu-
tions entail higher pensions).
21  German version: “ein sehr klassisches Kon-
zept  [...] was im Grunde abgrenzt Erwerbs-
tätigkeit von Ruhestand, was im Grunde sehr 
überkommen ist sag ich mal also die Vorstel-
lung dass man irgendwann mal ab einem 
bestimmten Alter was der Gesetzgeber auch 
noch definiert und gar nicht man selber sich 
quasi aus ner beruflichen Tätigkeit zurück-
zieht, oder zurückziehen muss und dann 
auf einmal nichts mehr macht ist eigentlich 
nicht so das Konzept, was wir als BDA, im 
Hinterkopf haben [continues and talks about 
improved health of people in pension age 
today] und insofern stellt sich natürlich schon 
die Frage, auch angesichts der demographi-
schen Entwicklung mit knapper werdenden 
Arbeitskräften, ob so eine sture Altersgrenze 
oder [...] son hartes Ausscheiden aus dem 
Erwerbsprozess ob das noch zeitgemäß ist.”
22  What exactly “this” relates to is not clear in 
the German original quote.
23  In the meantime, these reforms have been 
enacted (Pensions Act 2014).
24 The Sozialverband VDK is a very similar and 
‘competing’ organisation with more mem-
bers; several attempts to merge these two 
associations have failed so far. Furthermore, 
a smaller East German equivalent of these 
organisations exists, the Volkssolidarität 
(Schroeder et al. 238-45).
25  Anyway, such age limits would not be legal 
anymore under European equality regula-
tions, of which the experts are usually well 
aware.
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Attachment 1: List of included Documents
(Ordered by Country and Actors)*
Germany
Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft Deutscher Seniorenorganisationen (BAGSO)
 − 2011a: Potentiale des Alters nutzen: Altersgrenzen aufheben, Altersdiskriminierung 
überwinden
 − 2011b: Lebensleistung anerkennen, Altersarmut vermeiden
Bundesvereinigung Deutscher Arbeitgeberverbände (BDA)
 − 2005: Finanzierbarkeit und Leistungsfähigkeit der gesetzlichen Rentenversicherung 
durch entschlossene und nachhaltige Reformen sichern. Positionen der Arbeitgeber 
zur Reform der gesetzlichen Rentenversicherung
 − 2007: Teure Ausnahmeregelungen verhindern höhere Entlastung. Stellungnahme 
zum Entwurf der Bundesregierung zum RV-Altersgrenzenanpassungsgesetz vom 29. 
November 2006
 − 2009: Erfolgreich mit älteren Arbeitnehmern. Positionspapier zur konsequenten Fort-
setzung des erfolgreichen Kurses für mehr Beschäftigung älterer Arbeitnehmer
 − 2010: Hohes Beschäftigungsniveau ist beste Vorsorge gegen Altersarmut. Stellung-
nahme zum Antrag der SPD-Fraktion „Das Risiko von Altersarmut durch veränderte 
rentenrechtliche Bewertungen von Zeiten der Langzeitarbeitslosigkeit und der Nie-
driglohn-Beschäftigung bekämpfen“ (BT-Drs. 17/1747), zu den Anträgen der Frak-
tion DIE LINKE „Risiken der Altersarmut verringern – Rentenbeiträge für Langzeiter-
werbslose erhöhen“ (BT-Drs. 17/1735), „Verbesserung der Rentenanwartschaften von 
Langzeiterwerbslosen“ (BT-Drs. 17/256), „Schutz bei Erwerbsminderung umfassend 
verbessern – Risiken der Altersarmut verringern“ (BT-Drs. 17/1116), zum Antrag der 
Fraktion BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN „Mindestbeiträge zur Rentenversicherung ver-
bessern, statt sie zu streichen“ (BT-Drs. 17/2436). Öffentliche Anhörung des Aus-
schusses für Arbeit und Soziales des Deutschen Bundestages am 27. September 2010
 − 2011: An beschlossener Anhebung des gesetzlichen Rentenalters festhalten. Stel-
lungnahme zum ersten Bericht der Bundesregierung gemäß § 154 Abs. 4 SGB VI 
zur Anhebung der Regelaltersgrenze auf 67 Jahre (BT-Drs. 17/3814), zum Antrag 
der SPD-Fraktion „Chancen für die Teilhabe am Arbeitsleben nutzen – Arbeitsbe-
dingungen verbessern – Rentenzugang fl exibilisieren“ (BT-Drs. 17/3995), zum Ge-
setzentwurf der Fraktion DIE LINKE „Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Änderung des 
Sechsten Buches Sozialgesetzbuch und anderer Gesetze (RV-Altersgrenzenanpas-
* The authors have added commas and full stops in some instances to make very long titles more  
 legible.
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sungs-Aussetzungsgesetz)“ (BT-Drs. 17/3546), zum Antrag der Fraktion DIE LINKE 
„Rente ab 67 vollständig zurücknehmen“ (BT-Drs. 17/2935), zum Antrag der Fraktion 
BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN „Voraussetzungen für die Rente mit 67 schaffen“ (BT-
Drs. 17/4046). Öffentliche Anhörung des Ausschusses für Arbeit und Soziales des 
Deutschen Bundestages am 21. Februar 2011
Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB)
 − 2006: DGB-Stellungnahme zum Referentenentwurf eines Gesetzes zur Anpassung 
der Regelaltersgrenze an die demografi sche Entwicklung und zur Stärkung der Fi-
nanzierungsgrundlagen der gesetzlichen Rentenversicherung (RV-Altersgrenzenan-
passungsgesetz)
 − 2011: DGB-Stellungnahme zum Bericht der Bundesregierung gemäß § 154 Abs. 4 
SGB VI zur Anhebung der Regelaltersgrenze auf 67 Jahre „Aufbruch in die alters-
gerechte Arbeitswelt“ und zu den Anträgen Drs. 17/2935 und 17/3546 (Fraktion Die 
Linke), 17/3995 (Fraktion der SPD) sowie 17/4046 (Fraktion Bündnis 90/Die Grünen)
Sozialverband Deutschland (SoVD)
 − 2007a: Stellungnahme anlässlich der öffentlichen Anhörung des Ausschusses für Ar-
beit und Soziales des Deutschen Bundestages am 26. Februar 2007 in Berlin zu dem
(a) Gesetzentwurf der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und SPD. Entwurf eines Ge-
setzes zur Anpassung der Regelaltersgrenze an die demografi sche Entwicklung 
und zur Stärkung der Finanzierungsgrundlagen der gesetzlichen Rentenversi-
cherung (RV-Altersgrenzenanpassungsgesetz) – BT-Drs. 16/3794 
(b) Antrag der Abgeordeten Klaus Ernst, Katja Kipping, Karin Binder, weiterer Ab-
geordneter und der Fraktion DIE LINKE. Nein zur Rente ab 67 – BT-Drs. 16/2747
(c) Antrag der Abgeordneten Irmingard Schewe-Gerigk, Brigitte Poth-
mer, Markus Kurth, weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion BÜNDNIS 
90/DIE GRÜNEN Neue Kultur der Altersarbeit – Anpassung der gesetz-
lichen Rentenversicherung an längere Rentenlaufzeiten – BT-Drs. 16/3812 
(d) Antrag der Abgeordneten Volker Schneider (Saar-brücken), Klaus Ernst, Karin 
Binder, weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion DIE LINKE. Stichtagsregelung für 
die Altersteilzeit im RV-Altersgrenzenanpassungsgesetz (Rente mit 67) verlängern 
– BT-Drs. 16/3815 –
 − 2007b: Stellungnahme anlässlich der öffentlichen Anhörung des Ausschus-
ses für Arbeit und Soziales des Deutschen Bundestages am 26. Februar 2007 
in Berlin zu dem (a) Gesetzentwurf der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und SPD
Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Verbesserung der Beschäftigungschancen älte-
rer Menschen – BT-Drucksache 16/3793 – (b) Antrag der Abgeordneten Dirk
Niebel, Dr. Heinrich L. Kolb, Detlef Pfarr, weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion 
der FDP Weichenstellung für eine Verbesserung der Beschäftigungschancen Älterer 
– BT-Drucksache 16/241 – (c) Antrag der Abgeordneten Kornelia Möller, Dr. Barbara 
Höll, Werner Dreibus, weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion DIE LINKE. Beschäf-
tigungspolitik für Ältere – für ein wirtschafts- und arbeitsmarktpolitisches Gesamt-
konzept – BT-Drucksache 16/3027 – 
 − 2012a: Stellungnahme zum Referentenentwurf des Bundesministeriums für Ar-
beit und Soziales (BMAS) vom 22. März 2012. Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Anerken-
nung der Lebensleistung in der Rentenversicherung (RV- Lebensleistungsanerken-
nungsgesetz)
 − 2012b: [SoVD together with the union Ver.di]: Rentenzuschuss statt Zuschussrente 
 − 2012c: Stellungnahme zum Referenten-entwurf des Bundesministeriums für Arbeit 
und Soziales (BMAS) vom 7. August 2012. Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Stärkung der 
Alterssicherung (Alterssicherungsstärkungsgesetz)
United Kingdom Age UK
 − 2010: Consultation response. Phasing out the Default Retirement Age
 − 2011a: Pensions Bill. Second reading briefi ng
 − 2011b: Briefi ng. Older workers and ‘job blocking’
 − 2011c: State Pension age changes – how you are affected
 − 2011d: Pension bill briefi ng. Report stage and third reading
 − 2011e: Pension Credit and Universal Credit briefi ng
 − 2011f: Response to the autumn statement 2011
 − 2011g: Private pensions (United Kingdom)
 − 2012: State pensions (United Kingdom)
 − 2013: Policy position. Ageism and age equality
Confederation of British Industry (CBI)
 − 2009: A view from the top. The 2009 CBI pensions survey
 − 2010: CBI submission to the Government’s review of the Default Retirement Age
 − 2011: CBI Response to the Government’s green paper ‘A state pension for the 21st 
Century’
National Pensioners Convention (NPC)
 − 2009: Submission by the National Pensioners Convention to the Department for Work 
and Pensions select committee inquiry into tackling pensioner poverty in Great Britain
 − 2011: A state pension for the 21st century, green paper. Response from the National 
Pensioners Convention
 − 2013: A decent state pension for all generations
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Trades Union Congress (TUC)
 − 2005: 'Equality and diversity: Coming of Age' consultation. TUC response to govern-
ment consultation on draft employment equality (age) regulations
 − 2006: Pensions commission report. TUC initial response
 − 2008: National lobby demands a decent state pension for all generations [press re-
lease]
 − 2009a: Retirement age ruling a blow to people who need to work beyond 65, says 
TUC [press release]
 − 2009b: Raising state pension age to 70 would put older people in workless limbo, 
says TUC [press release]
 − 2011a: TUC welcomes abolition of the default retirement age [press release]
 − 2011b: Growing inequalities in life expectancy show unfairness of higher pension 
age [press release]
 − 2011c: Over-50s and retired faring better than young people in jobs market [press 
release]
 − 2011d: Workers celebrating 65th birthday tomorrow have an extra reason to cheer 
[press release]
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Frank Nullmeier
Out of the Public Eye - 
The International Labour 
Organisation in die Media
ZeS-Arbeitspapier Nr. 01/2014
Politics takes place in public communication and is part of 
public communication. Today, public communication is sub-
stantially determined by the media. This is also the case for 
the field of global social policy. The following study address-
es the question of how global social policy and, in particular, 
the International Labour Organization (ILO) as the key player 
in global social policy, is discussed in the media. Are global 
social policy and the ILO visible at all in the media? To what 
extent is the organisation visible? How do the media report 
about the ILO and on what exactly does media coverage of 
the ILO focus?
Frank Nullmeier 
 
Out of the Public Eye – 
The International 
Labour Organisation 
in the Media
ZeS-Working Paper No. 01/2014
Herbert Obinger/Klaus Petersen
Mass Warfare
and the Welfare State
Causal Mechanisms
and Effects
ZeS-Arbeitspapier 02/2014
The question whether and how warfare has influenced the 
development of advanced Western welfare states is contest-
ed. So far, scholarly work either focused on the trade-off be-
tween military and social spending or on case studies of in-
dividual countries. What is missing, however, is a systematic 
comparative approach that is informed by an explicit con-
sideration of the underlying causal mechanisms. This paper 
outlines an agenda for a comparative analysis of the warfare 
-welfare state nexus. By distinguishing between three dif-
ferent phases (war preparation, warfare, and post-war pe-
riod) it provides a comprehensive analysis of possible causal 
mechanisms linking war and the welfare state and provides 
preliminary empirical evidence for war waging, occupied and 
neutral countries in the age of mass warfare stretching from 
ca. the 1860s to the 1960s.
Herbert Obinger
Klaus Petersen
Mass Warfare
the Welfare State and
Causal Mechanisms
and Effects
ZeS-Working Paper No. 02/2014
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Aline Grünewald
Social Security around
the World
A Review of Datasets
ZeS-Arbeitspapier 03/2014
Due to increasing scholarly interest in social policy reforms 
and processes of policy diffusion, comprehensive datasets 
on social security systems are all the more necessary. As 
such, this paper provides an overview of existing datasets on 
social security and discusses their strengths and shortcom-
ings. The projects presented are appropriate for empirical 
analyses, including both event history analyses and multivar-
iate regressions. As much of the research on social security 
systems thus far has mainly focused on OECD countries, this 
paper takes a closer look on data of the Non-OECD world, 
which can be used to supplement existing data projects and 
for the analysis of global social security dynamics.
Aline Grünewald
Social Security
around the World
A Review of Datasets
ZeS-Working Paper No. 03/2014
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